Russia’s military and economic resources are stretched thin by the war in Ukraine. Its former stronghold in Syria has fallen. Yet, even under these circumstances, the Kremlin has adapted to new realities rather than decided to withdraw from the Middle East.
Russia continues to exploit opportunities provided by the region to ease the pressure of sanctions, compensate economic and political losses from its global confrontation with the West, and occasionally create challenges for the US and European players.
Consequently, analysts who dismiss Russia as ‘finished’ in the region risk overlooking a weakened but still capable actor that remains committed to complicating Western objectives.
A nimble strategy after 2022
Since 2022, analysts have focused obsessively on developments seen as unfavorable to the Kremlin: whether serious strategic setbacks such as the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in 2024, or more symbolic blows such as Moscow’s exclusion from the Sharm El-Sheikh peace summit in October 2025. Yet events that are far more consequential for Russia often receive little attention.
One such example was the Saudi–Russian business and investment forum held in early December. The meeting produced a major outcome: a comprehensive visa-free agreement, a treaty Riyadh rarely signs with other countries. The forum signaled that Russia still enjoys high-level recognition in Saudi Arabia and underscored that its economic partnerships in the Gulf remain intact.
This contrast between global narratives of Russia’s ‘decline’ and the practical outcomes Moscow continues to secure raises a broader question: does Russia truly need to occupy the spotlight at every regional event to remain influential? Or does it benefit from operating as a seemingly diminished second-tier player that still achieves strategic gains?
The answer lies in Russia’s long-standing approach: weakness does not equate to powerlessness. After 2022, under pressure from sanctions and military overstretch, its strategy became more low-cost, yet increasingly agile.
Russia tends to avoid engaging in high-risk initiatives unless absolutely necessary. In the past, Moscow’s vocal concern over developments in Gaza served as a low-cost way to signal its presence on the international stage.
By contrast, participating in the current Gaza peace initiative would entail committing resources and political responsibility, with highly uncertain outcomes. In this sense, Moscow’s absence from Sharm El-Sheikh was likely a blessing in disguise for the Kremlin.
‘Do more with less’: The new Russian playbook
The Kremlin has elevated its ‘do-more-with-less’ approach to a new level, relying on diplomacy, selective coercion, and targeted partnerships rather than major military deployments.
Russia amplifies the visibility of its diplomatic engagements, creating the impression of indispensability even when its actual material footprint is limited.
Remaining strictly pragmatic, Moscow keeps open lines to all sides: Iran and Israel, Turkey and the Gulf monarchies, Egypt, and different factions in Syria and Libya. Its goal is not to resolve conflicts but to ensure it retains a voice.
Even without Syria as an operational hub, Russia preserves a mediatory or ‘spoiler’ capacity in regional crises. For instance, Israeli officials may have been concerned that a full Russian withdrawal from Syria might open space for less predictable actors, such as Turkey, and therefore accepted the Kremlin’s continued presence in the post-Assad country. When Iran–Israel tensions escalated after Assad’s fall, Moscow carefully avoided obstructing Israeli strikes while maintaining dialogue with Tehran.
Iran, though frustrated by Russia’s unwillingness to more forcefully support it during the June confrontation with Israel, will ultimately have to accept that Moscow remains an indispensable partner for as long as the standoff with the US and EU persists. And the West is unlikely to overlook Iran’s provision of Shahed drones to support Russia’s war in Ukraine. As a result, Russia, alongside China, remains one of the few viable strategic partners available to Tehran.
Russia also avoids locking itself into rigid alliances. It may have close ties with the Haftar family in Libya, yet it still explores a potential revival of Qaddafi-era economic projects with Haftar’s opponents in the Tripoli government. Similar hedging efforts ensured that the collapse of Assad’s regime, despite being a strategic and reputational blow, did not push Russia out of Syria.
Power projection without large deployments
Even with a reduced presence, Russia retains the ability to project power. By retaining footholds in Libya and Syria, it can channel personnel and weapons into various African and Middle Eastern conflicts, defying Western-backed embargoes when useful. Such indirect tools allow Moscow to prop up regimes or groups opposed by the West while avoiding major military commitments.
Equally important are Russia’s economic levers. Coordination with OPEC+ (especially Saudi Arabia) helps Moscow regulate oil output and prices, mitigating the effects of Western sanctions.
That is just one piece of a more global puzzle. Russia has rerouted trade flows through Gulf intermediaries, using them both as a transit hub and consumer market for its petroleum products, foodstuffs, petrochemical inputs, IT technologies, and investment capitals.
The UAE and Saudi Arabia are also actively investing in Russia’s economy. Through its growing role in regional food and energy security, and nuclear projects, Russia further embeds itself in the Middle East while complicating Western attempts to isolate it.
Exploiting a divided Middle East
Russia’s ability to punch above its weight is also enabled by divisions in and around the region. The US and Europe often disagree on Middle East policy, while regional states increasingly pursue multi-vector strategies rather than align exclusively with the West.
Moscow thrives in these gaps. Gulf monarchies have maintained strong relations with Russia since 2022, despite deep security ties with Washington. None joined Western sanctions on Moscow.
Instead, they are increasing economic cooperation: In August, for instance, UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan announced an ambition to double trade turnover with Russia in five years. (Russian-Emirati trade had already nearly tripled during 2019 – 2024, from $3.5 billion to $9.5 billion). Such moves create political and financial breathing room for the Kremlin and weaken Western pressure.