While wars dominate headlines elsewhere in the region, Iraqis are battling a quieter but equally destabilising crisis. Climate change is drying rivers, upstream neighbours are cutting water flows, and the leaders of the country historically known as the ‘Land of the Two Rivers’ have failed to manage its most vital resource.
This water scarcity is not only a national crisis but a growing driver of internal tension, fuelling displacement, deepening rural poverty, triggering major public health problems, and stoking unrest in already fragile communities.
Iraq is facing its lowest water reserves in over 80 years, dropping from approximately 18 billion cubic meters last year to around 10 billion today. The impacts are visible across the country in different but equally damaging ways. In Dhi Qar along the southern Euphrates, more than 10,000 families have been displaced because of shrinking rivers and drying marshes.
In Basra, rising salinity and pollution due to water scarcity are triggering a surge in water-related illnesses. In different cities across Iraq, residents are protesting lack of water and demanding solutions, as some have been without water for more than a month. The crisis has also impacted the country’s food security, with the minister of water resources announcing in summer 2025 the suspension of September farming plans, including wheat cultivation, due to severe water shortages.
The Euphrates and Tigris rivers in Iraq with major dams in nearby countries. Sources: World Bank, Natural Earth, Geohack.
Upstream pressures
While reduced rainfall and rising temperatures are global challenges, Iraq’s water crisis is also the result of upstream restrictions and domestic neglect. Major Turkish and Iranian dams have sharply reduced river flows, yet the Baghdad government has failed to respond with consistent, professional, water diplomacy. Corruption and self-interest among Iraq’s political elite weaken institutional capacity and create openings for Turkey and Iran to press for deals that serve their own priorities. Internal rivalries leave Iraq without a coherent strategy to protect its share.
Iraq’s water security is heavily influenced by upstream infrastructure in Turkey, Iran, and, to a lesser extent, Syria.
In Turkey, the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) spans more than 22 major dams and 19 hydroelectric plants on the Tigris and Euphrates. On the Euphrates, key installations include various dams such as the Atatürk dam, one of the world’s largest, which regulate flow before the river enters Syria. On the Tigris, the Ilisu Dam – completed in 2020 – has already faced criticism for restricting water flows to Iraq, while the under-construction Cizre Dam is expected to further reduce downstream availability.
Iran has also re-engineered water flows through dams and diversion projects on tributaries feeding the Tigris. The Sirwan (Diyala) and Little Zab rivers are among those most affected, with major installations such as the Daryan and Sardasht dams and multiple diversion tunnels redirecting water for Iranian agriculture and hydropower. Syria’s role is more limited but still significant, with the Tabqa dam regulating flows from Turkey before the river enters Iraq.
Although Iraq has signed memoranda of understanding and technical agreements with its neighbours, these remain limited, non-binding, and unenforced. Upstream countries continue to exploit the political instability in Iraq and Syria for their own gain. Turkey frequently violates the 1987 transboundary water agreement with Syria, releasing less than the agreed amount.
Internal failures and governance gaps
In response to worsening water shortages in recent weeks, the Iraqi government has announced measures including the construction of 10 rainwater-harvesting dams in desert areas and the awarding of the long-delayed Basra seawater desalination project to a Chinese/Iraqi consortium.
While both address urgent needs, their timing reflects a familiar pattern in which action comes only when scarcity reaches a crisis point. Past initiatives of this scale have often stalled or faced long delays due to Iraq’s failures fall into three interconnected patterns: corruption, lack of policy continuity, and outright negligence, all of which are aggravated by inefficient water use.
Corruption and political interference have stalled or derailed key water infrastructure projects. In Basra, major desalination initiatives have faced repeated delays, cost escalations, and disputes over contracts. Local reports suggest that political favouritism and opaque tendering processes undermined the project’s implementation. This has left residents dependent on deteriorating water networks and vulnerable to the same risks that caused the 2018 crisis, in which hundreds of thousands were hospitalized due to contaminated water.
Similar concerns have emerged over deals with Turkish companies, where water releases were reportedly linked to awarding dam construction contracts to Ankara’s firms, turning national resources into bargaining chips.