Iran’s internet shutdown signals a new stage of digital isolation

The widespread blackout in response to protests reflects the Iranian regime’s dangerous embrace of digital isolation as a long-term strategy of repression.

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Published 23 January 2026

Updated 26 January 2026 — 4 minute READ

Image — An Iranian man speaks on his mobile phone as he walks past a burned-out bus during recent anti-government unrest in downtown Tehran, Iran, on 18 January 2026. Photo by Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto via Getty Images.

Dr Nayana Prakash

Former Research Fellow, International Security Programme

On 8 January 2026, amid widespread protests and a violent government crackdown, the Iranian regime shut off all internet services, beginning one of the most extensive internet shutdowns ever recorded. An estimated 92 million citizens are cut off from the internet and have limited access to phone and text messaging. As the blackout continues, information from the country is increasingly limited, and there is fear that the death toll is far higher than some estimates suggest.

Iran has weaponized digital blackouts in reaction to protests in the past, most notably in 2019 and 2022. Yet this latest blackout is far more severe and sophisticated than previous ones and targets even the domestic Iranian intranet. The shutdown has simultaneously cut out previously vital tools like the Starlink satellite system, used by ordinary Iranians, while allowing government leaders to continue to use social media such as X and Telegram. 

This digital divide may enable the government to deny internet services to citizens for longer; an Iranian official claimed the internet would be restored on Friday, but it was reportedly still down at the time of publication. And government spokeswoman Fatemeh Mohajerani has indicated to media activists that international online services would not be restored before the Persian festival of Nowruz, on March 20.

The shutdown may also signal a longer-term strategy for the Iranian government. Internet monitor Filterwatch asserts that Iran is now aiming for ‘absolute digital isolation’; completely cutting off the country from global platforms, and allowing access to the global internet only for those with security clearance, via a strict ‘White List’. Iran has developed its own isolated domestic Internet known as the National Information Network (NIN), which could be used as a substitute for overseas platforms.  

This shift into total digital isolationism would reshape the lives of Iranian citizens and signal a dangerous transition into near-total government control, offering a blueprint for other authoritarian regimes across the world. Even if the internet returns to Iran, there are no guarantees about what kind of internet this will be – nor who has access to it.

Escalating repression, limiting tools

Previous internet blackouts in Iran were less sophisticated in scope, allowing some people to circumvent them via VPNs (virtual private networks) and censorship-resilient technologies such as peer-to-peer networks. Essential services like banking and local apps were able to function. This is no longer the case. For Iranians, this is the closest the country has come to a total shutdown.

Starlink, Elon Musk’s satellite internet service, has previously been a lifeline for Iranians during blackouts. It is, however, illegal in Iran, and using the service carries a sentence of up to two years. Internet rights groups report that, in an unprecedented move for the Iranian state, the government is reportedly currently jamming satellite signals using military-grade mobile jammers, which slow or block connectivity. 

Similar jammers have been deployed by Russia in Ukraine, indicating there may be information and system sharing between Moscow and Tehran. Alongside basic internet services, these jammers also degrade SMS and mobile phone signals. Iran has also begun hunting for tell-tale Starlink satellite dishes on homes in Tehran, further degrading the amount of information Iranians are able to share with the world.

The criminalization of Starlink is just one example of the significant threat Iranians face in attempting to communicate. As connectivity deteriorates, there is concern about the quality of information flowing in and out of Iran. Accounts and photographs trickling out of the nation have been accused of being misinformation or disinformation originating from both the Iranian government and other actors. 

The Iranian information space is already susceptible to mistrust, leaving it open to manipulation by the Iranian regime. The internet shutdown in the country has further muddied these waters, making it easy for the regime to portray real content as Western-manufactured deepfakes or AI-generated conspiracies. Without verifiable information, regular communication or a sense of the true scale of the regime’s violence, it is very difficult for Iranians to continue to work towards a better future, despite years of activism. 

Digital isolationism and the ‘kill switch’

Iran’s digital ambitions have moved beyond creating disruption to more structural digital isolation. There is evidence that Iran is moving towards a tiered internet system, where internet access is not automatic, but rather subject to approval and security clearance. Filterwatch reports that foreign telecommunications companies have quietly left Iran in recent days, indicating a potential end to certain international global infrastructural partnerships. 

This suggests a restructuring of Iran’s internet itself towards the domestic NIN. This move towards government-owned platforms would enable far greater surveillance of the population, while allowing officials to retain access to global platforms to disseminate regime-endorsed messaging.

Iran is not alone in its apparent pursuit to disconnect from the global internet. China has long had ‘The Great Chinese Firewall’ blocking citizens from much of the global internet. As the global web has expanded, China has built its own systems and apps which allow for enormous state censorship. Russia, too, operates a so-called ‘Ru-Net’, building its own communications platforms and blocking many Western platforms and VPNs. 

Digital authoritarianism is on the rise globally.

China and Russia’s existing systems generate fear, making people cautious and distrustful of online spaces, and thus reluctant to speak openly and to organize. But Iran seems to want to go a step further, making it virtually impossible for ordinary users to connect to the internet at all. Like Russia, Iran is reportedly aiming for a ‘kill switch’, making it possible to cut off the country from the internet very quickly and for extended periods of time. 

A ‘kill switch’ would cohere with the regime’s strategy for societal control: limiting social unity, disrupting protest movements and severing ties with the outside world. Even if the internet returns to Iran, it will likely be slowly degraded, with more restrictions, slower access, shutdowns and, most importantly, increased uncertainty – itself a powerful tool of repression.  

The rise of shutdowns 

Iran’s plans for shutdowns may be on a greater scale than most other countries. But digital authoritarianism is on the rise globally, and digital rights organizations and the UN can do little to stop it. 

Iran’s internet shutdown will not last forever, in part because it is extremely costly for the government to maintain. Iran’s e-commerce sector will be crippled by this outage. Other Iranian businesses are also hurt by the shutdown of online advertising, and generally by the violent crackdown on protests, which has reduced footfall in Iranian shops. Eventually, the government will likely have no choice but to restore services – albeit in limited ways. Yet once internet access is framed as a security threat rather than a public utility, it rarely returns in an open or unconditional form. 

But after weeks of protest and security crackdowns in Iran, the internet is only one part of the larger puzzle, and its shutdown is an indication of a deeper trajectory. For external actors, the challenge should not simply be how to restore access in moments of crisis. Rather, it is how to recognize when shutdowns indicate steps towards longer-term digital isolation. 

There can be no free and open internet under the current regime. Any response to Iran’s internet blackout must be understood as inseparable from the wider political crisis facing the country, and from the regime’s determination to control not only information, but indeed the very conditions under which Iranian life can be imagined.