As NATO ministers met in Brussels this week, the main undercurrent was once again the extent to which US President Donald Trump remains committed to the alliance and European security – especially Ukraine’s.
The meeting came amid reports that the US will be handing over command of key NATO structures, including the Allied Joint Command in Naples and Joint Force Command Norfolk, to European leadership. It was also marked by the conspicuous and highly unusual absence of US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, which seemingly reflected the US shift to deprioritizing the alliance.
While Hegseth’s absence took up most airspace during an otherwise apparently ‘back to normal’ meeting (after recent tensions over Greenland), far less attention was paid to Europe’s own increased ambivalence towards the Transatlantic relationship. This leaves a dangerous vacuum, especially in US strategic thinking.
In Washington, many in the policy community have not fully acknowledged that Europeans do not consider the current administration an aberration. Instead, many on the continent see it as a wake-up call to more fundamentally and permanently reduce their reliance on the US – militarily, economically and technologically – no matter who wins the next elections.
This prospect of a more autonomous Europe, less beholden to the US, carries the seeds for significant future tensions. Managing these tensions will require more strategic thinking and careful management on both sides of the Atlantic.
A paradigm shift in Europe
Much of the discussion on the implications of a potential US retreat from Europe – especially a rapid, chaotic one – has focused on the extent to which the continent can protect itself and support Ukraine in the immediate future.
This focus on the short-term is largely justified. Europe needs at least five to ten years to rearm, while according to NATO’s own estimates, Russia may attempt an incursion into NATO territory in as soon as four. The current European response still lacks urgency and strategic vision. Last week, the Franco-German fighter jet partnership, FCAS, was reported to be dead; this week, Germany’s Merz immediately dismissed Macron’s call for Eurobonds to fund Europe’s ambitions.
However, a fundamental shift is nonetheless taking place. While some European leaders may still be kowtowing to the Trump administration to keep the US on board, the European public and political class increasingly want more independence from Washington.
The fall in public support for the US across Europe has been remarkable. Recent polling has shown that across Europe, Europeans now see the US unfavourably. Among the understandably aggrieved Danes, it’s 84 per cent – up from only 20 percent in July 2023. Eighty-one per cent of the European public support more European military integration. Social media is awash with patriotic AI images of a unified European army defending the Arctic.
European leaders will increasingly feel the need to respond to this US-sceptic, pro-EU current among their electorates. Many of them are already calling for a stronger Europe and decoupling from the US. This is not just rhetoric. It will fundamentally shape the direction and nature of the decisions the continent takes on its rearmament and future security.
While Europe still has a long way to go, belated investments in rebuilding its defence-industrial base are starting to bear fruit. EU-level defence spending vehicles such as SAFE are heavily oversubscribed, and in large part being funnelled into European systems and suppliers. European governments are exploring alternative groupings and formats that can act more decisively and effectively without the US. The Nordic and Baltic countries, for example, have become a focal point of increased integration, while the incoming Dutch government has called for the creation of a European ‘Five Eyes’ for intelligence sharing.
This combination of a loss of trust, growing patriotic fervour and expedited integration efforts – backed up by high levels of defence spending – has set Europe on a trajectory towards more independence from the US. The current (likely brief) entente over Greenland or a potential change of political winds in the US following mid-term elections in November are unlikely to reverse it. Nor would the election of a more Transatlantic-minded administration in 2028.
It is far from clear whether policy elites in Washington, on both sides of the aisle, have fully recognized this moment of rupture – let alone whether they are ready to imagine a future in which they are no longer fully in the driver’s seat on the continent.
Diverging expectations
Underpinning this rupture is a fundamental difference in understanding of what Europe doing more for its security actually looks like. For many Europeans, it increasingly means a continent which can go it alone. For the Americans, it has long meant a Europe that spends more on defence – but does so on US terms.
Even now, as the Trump Administration hands over command of some of the key NATO structures to European leadership, it has in the process strengthened its hold over the key Allied Marine, Air and Land Commands. European allies are still expected to follow US war planning and rely on American leadership and strategic enablers. Attempts to build European alternatives to these capabilities have been frequently dismissed as wasteful duplication and fragmentation.
From Washington’s perspective, NATO allies spending more means spending more on US weapons. This is at odds with the growing push on the continent by countries like France and, to an extent, the European Commission to ‘Buy European’ and reduce their reliance on US systems. In the US, these efforts are not only considered highly unwelcome; they are also frequently written off as hopelessly naïve and infeasible. This message has been echoed by NATO’s leadership itself: just last month, Secretary General Mark Rutte suggested Europe would not be able to – and would effectively never be able to – defend itself without the US, nor should it want to.
Perhaps this analysis will prove correct. Not even entertaining alternatives to US dependency, however, leaves a dangerous vacuum in strategic thinking in Washington (and arguably NATO HQ) that may well lead to significant tensions further down the line.