Israel–Palestine: Can neighbouring countries offer a way forward?

Dr Sanam Vakil

Good afternoon, good morning, good evening, welcome, everyone, to Chatham House’s Israel-Palestinian series – first Palestine series. My name is Sanam Vakil. I’m the Director of the Middle East and North Africa Programme here at Chatham House. And it’s my great pleasure to welcome a wonderful panel to discuss how regional states in the Middle East and North Africa are responding to the War in Gaza. And we are also going to be considering how, if at all, neighbouring countries across the region can play a role, or offer a – offer – take up some sort of responsibility for their post-war settlement.

So, we have a lot to discuss on the table. I have a great panel. With me here today, we are livestreaming, and we are on the record, so thank you for joining us. Please do put your questions in the Q&A and we will make every effort to take on as many questions as possible. I’m going to give our panellists an opportunity to highlight some key points that they’re thinking about as we get started and then, I will open up to questions and again, looking forward to hearing from as many people as possible.

Let me briefly introduce the panel, all colleagues and experts that I highly respect and working on a broad array of regional issues. First, let me introduce Dr Elham Fakhro, who is an Associate Fellow at Chatham House’s Middle East/North Africa Programme. Elham has published widely and worked on a broad array of issues, and I believe she has a forthcoming book out on The Abraham Accords and Normalization. So, she has much to contribute there.

Welcome, Mirette, it’s good to see you, Mirette Mabrouk from the Middle East Institute, and Mirette is a Senior Research Fellow and Founding Director of the Egypt Program there at MEI and we’re glad that she can join us and offer her expertise, as well, on Egypt and also, broader dynamics. And last, but certainly not least, is my long-time colleague, Dr Renad Mansour, who is a Senior Research Fellow at Chatham House’s MENA Programme. He also runs our Iraq Initiative and also, works on our XCEPT cross-border project, looking at transnational conflict across multiple geographies. So, welcome to you, as well, Renad.

So, to get us started and just a bit of a framing of where we are. We’re in the second month of this horrendous war, which, of course, we’re watching playout with huge consequences for the people in Gaza and ripple effects across the region that are very hard to predict and anticipate where we will be. We have, of course, still no ceasefire, although there is mounting pressure and a growing consensus that – from Western countries that a ceasefire should come soon.

Countries across the Middle East and North Africa gathered just last weekend in – holding two summits, an Arab League Summit and Organisation of the Islamic Countries [means Co-operation] Summit, where collectively, they called for a ceasefire. And they are – a Special Taskforce from the OIC is travelling to the P5 countries: Russia, China, the US, UK and France, to press collectively for a ceasefire. And that mission is very much underway.

We also have yet to see anymore hostages released, although a hostage deal is apparently imminent. There has been no sig – regular and significant provision of aid to help the people of Gaza that are under extraordinary pressure, that it is beyond the pale. The death and destruction and the daily tragedy is continuing to rise. And beyond that, we have no real public discussion as to what is going to come after the expected, maybe anticipated, ceasefire and hostage release.

And so, in this next hour, it would be great to hear about the complexities of different countries across the region, from Jordan to Egypt, the Gulf states, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Iran. They all have deep interests and, of course, at the same time, there is no collective unity on how to move forward. So, we are certainly in a moment that has consequences for the region, where, you know, perhaps there is a role for mediation, but perhaps there are limitations for regional states, as well.

There has also been a very clear indication, over the past few weeks, but most strongly in the past, I think, 48 hours, that Iran does not intend to escalate and currently join in and make this a broader regional conflict. But the activity and uptake of violence and attacks from groups in Iraq, as well as Hezbollah and the Houthis that just detained a Israeli ship in Hudaydah, does continue to raise alarm and concerns across the region, but also internationally.

So, with that framing, and feel free to pick apart any of these points or issues that you don’t agree with, as well, let me start with you, Mirette, if you don’t mind, and ask you to maybe reflect on where you see Egypt’s role in this conflict. It was very active, proactive at the beginning, very much managing tensions and challenges over the Rafah border, pushing back against Israeli suggestions of moving Gazans into the Sinai, for example. And, you know, of course, there are domestic dynamics in Egypt that are important to pull apart with – we have seen protests in Egypt, but we’ve also – we’re aware that Sisi is about to embark on a Presidential election.

How do you see things playing out at this moment? And is Egypt, sort of, an effective mediator in this crisis, or is it, you know, really focusing more on its domestic priorities?

Mirette F. Mabrouk

Right, so, first of all, thank you so much for having me. You’ve put a lot on the table, so there’s a lot to unpack. I think if we take your last part first, all countries will do what is in their interest first and then, hopefully, good things will follow from that. But there’s always an onus on what’s good for you domestically, whether it’s in security terms or foreign policy terms or, you know, international relations.

In this particular case, Egypt is particularly concerned, because you have several issues. There’s – one, there are the foreign policy considerations. Egypt has a longstanding relationship and agreement with Israel and, generally speaking, government relations are extremely solid. Internally, there is, and always has been, overwhelming support for the Palestinian people. And I do think that, actually, what’s happened has made it very, very clear to those who’d said that the interest in the Palestinian tragedy was – had somehow abated or that younger people were bored with it, but I do think it’s brought home the fact that this is not the case. And certainly, in Egypt, people are overwhelmingly pro-Palestinian.

So, on the domestic front, if there was one thing that the Arab Spring brought home, it was that no governments, whether they’re elected or not, or whether they’re more authoritarian or not, no governments can afford to ignore their public. And as you pointed out, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi is coming up to elections. So, what happens domestically and what happens as far as public opinion goes is massively important to him. So, they need to be seen to be clearly supporting the Palestinians.

On a security front, you mentioned the consistent efforts and unrelenting and actually, for me, surprisingly shortsighted from the – on the part of Israel, but we can come back to that later, if you like, the attempt to try and push Palestinians into Egypt. Now, one, you have the more altruistic version side of matters, which is Egypt will not, as have – all the Arabs have said, “will not aid in the massed forced expulsion of Palestinians, because once they are shoved out, they’re not going to go back.” The other one is security. Egypt has been fighting an Islamist security in North Sinai for over a decade. It’s only just starting to clean it up, and the arrival, excuse me, the arrival of possibly hoards of Hamas militants is going to be a huge security risk.

I don’t want to take too long, but is Egypt an effective media? Yes, it is. Egypt is one of the most effective mediators. So, I think Egypt and Qatar, I think, are the standouts in this, although the role of the US is essential, because the US is the only country that can bring any pressure to bear on Israel, although it’s shown no desire to do so. But yes, Egypt is essential. It has the contacts, it’s on the other side. It has the ability to be able to ensure certain, what’s the word, certain safeguards for Israel. So, yes, it is essential. I don’t want to go on too long. I’m happy to come back to all this.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Certainly. I think you’ve set us up with the complexities of Egypt’s position, but I do want to come back to you on a few of the points that you’ve raised, particularly on the issue of shortsightedness, that I think is a really important point. And thank you for also bringing the really important, you know, sort of, role of the US that hangs over this. And we do, I hope, collectively – can we pick apart, you know, what this is going to mean, over a longer period of time, broadly for longstanding relations and dependencies with the US, but also, you know, the broader order issues that seem to be, sort of, cracking, if not beyond that.

But let me turn to Elham, who is in Washington, and I know you’ve been there for a few weeks. You have, I’m sure, picked up on many things while you’re there, but you’ve also been following the various Gulf states’ response. You know, and it’s very important not to look at a collective response, but they – you know, all countries have their domestic drivers and priorities here.

I’m keen to hear you from you, as someone who’s been working on normalisation and how you see – or is there a, sort of, difference between countries that have normalised ties versus the broader GCC? Saudi Arabia, of course, was getting there, but not quite on the precipice, despite whatever was reported. And then, of course, you have different positions from Qatar and Kuwait and Oman. So, could you just, sort of, walk us through where and how you see Gulf states responding? Is there a unity? Is there opportunity? I know you have a lot to say, so why don’t you pick up what you’d like?

Elham Fakhro

Alright, thank you, Sanam. It’s good to be with you today, and yeah, a lot to unpack when it comes to the Gulf states. So, first of all, they are on the same page in very general terms. All Gulf states would like to see a ceasefire, they’ve all been articulate about that, and they’ve joined other Arab and Islamic states and – in calling for a ceasefire, in addition to two other points. They’ve all called for the entry of greater humanitarian aid into Gaza and in the long-term, the revival of a political settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. So, on those three points the Gulf states are very much united, and they’re on the same page, not only just out of concern for the Palestinians, but out of fears that this might turn into a regional conflict and begin to threaten their interests in a more specific and direct way.

Now, where the Gulf states differ is in terms of the specifics of how to attain these objectives and particularly how far they’re actually willing to go to pressurise Israel to shift course. And this is where we really see differences between the Gulf states that have normalised their relations with Israel and those that have not.

So, Saudi Arabia, first and foremost, has gone the furthest by suspending its normalisation talks with Israel. It’s taken the lead in convening Arab and Islamic states, to send a co-ordinated joint message to the West, to the United States, but actually, the Arab and Islamic world is united on this issue. So, as you mentioned, they hosted the joint summit between the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic Co-operation earlier this month. There was the joint statement to the effect of, “Ceasefire, more aid than a political solution.” But within that summit, we also saw differences between countries like Algeria and Iran that were really calling for the states that have economic and diplomatic ties to Israel to cut those ties. And between the willingness of the normalising countries, Jordan, Egypt, etc., the two Gulf states, to actually go and do that. The only country that has taken diplomatic action on this front is Jordan, which recalled its Ambassador. So, there are real differences there, despite the, kind of, united fronts, in terms of what countries are actually willing to do.

Now, as you mentioned, Saudi Arabia, it’s next role, as well, has been as part of this group of Arab and Islamic countries that are touring the P5 nations. They were in Beijing yesterday, they were in Russia today, and I think that, you know, that shouldn’t be dismissed. It’s really intended to send the message, as well, to the United States that they’re serious about this, that the other P5 powers are onboard, at least some of them, and it’s just another way of adding diplomatic pressure. Again, the, kind of, move to Russia and China, I think is interesting, because it’s in line with what the Gulf countries have been doing anyway, within the past few years, building ties with China in a variety of ways. As we’ve seen last March, China was integral to the Saudi and Iran reconciliation. So, I think this just sends another, kind of – it’s another way of pushing diplomatically a little bit.

Now, that’s – all of us have been, you know, sort of, Saudi led in many ways. I thought it was playing its only little diplomatic role. Again, this is a continuation of what it has already been doing as this broker between the West and groups that the West doesn’t want to talk to, let’s just say. So, Qatar is playing an important role. I think they have – I mean, they did say yesterday that a deal is on the horizon. It looks like that’s going to be for the release of 50 hostages, 50 Israeli hostages, in exchange for a five-day ceasefire. Hamas has actually also commented and said that there may be Palestinian prisoners released. It’s not clear whether that’s going to be the case, but that is what Hamas would want.

Qatar is also reiterating that it’s exercising its role in response to US requests, which is, I think, significant, as well, to situate Qatar as not acting, really, outside the contours of what the United States wants. So, Qatar exercising its mediation, yeah, as a response to US requests and as it also did previously with Afghanistan and to release the Iranian hostages, as well.

So, the two countries, as well, that are really not that willing to shift course among the Gulf countries are the two that have diplomatic ties with Israel. The UAE and Bahrain have been very, very clear about this. They’ve been clear about the fact that The Accords are not going to be affected by events in Gaza. Previously, they were clear about the fact that The Accords are not going to be affected by events in Israel, either. So, I think this is being seen as, kind of, one of the first challenges to the Abraham Accords, but they really aren’t.

The Accords have been challenged since the day they were enacted. So, on the day that the agreements were made, Netanyahu walked back on his promises to permanently suspend the annexation of the West Bank. He came out and said that “No, actually, it’s just a temporary suspension.” There have been multiple challenges on that relationship since then, most notably with bringing in – Netanyahu’s decision to bring in extremists into his coalition government, which the Gulf states were not happy about. With the expansion of settlements, as well, they’ve not been happy about that. But they’ve been clear that these challenges, if you want to call them that, don’t affect the relationship and so, I don’t think we have any reason to expect any change here. And in fact, both Gulf states have been pretty critical of Hamas, so that also sets them apart in tone and in rhetoric.

So, that’s where the Gulf states stand right now. I think when thinking about a diplomatic path forward, we do need to look at the appetite for that in Israel, what Israeli leaders are saying. And really, the bigger question around this, which is how much can you do as the United States continues to really back Israel in this war and be, you know, refusing to put pressure on Israel in many ways? And so, I think that’s really what we need to think about, what can the Arab states do, how far can they go, while the United States is still so committed to its relationship – to supporting Israel, let’s just say? Yeah.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Thank you, Elham. You, of course, as well, have raised a huge number of issues and, you know, thank you for, sort of, making the really clear case for Qatar. It’s not operating solely on its own behest, but clearly, working in tandem with the United States and I think that’s a point that’s is oftentimes missed in the public domain. But beyond that, you know, breaking apart the dynamics across the region, I think, in the Gulf, are very important and, you know, maybe we can come back to the issue of the UAE and Bahrain that have been very upfront and, you know, directly condemning Hamas, actually perhaps more forcefully than other countries. But, you know, consider what role, if any, they might have, going forward.

Keen to hear your views, and again, thank you for, sort of, bringing us back to, you know, really what hangs over this, which is the role of the United States. And I think after I bring Renad into this conversation, I think we should all, sort of, unpack that a bit and consider – I want to hear from all of you about the role of the United States and the implications of the US position for all of these countries that are, you know, deeply tied and connected to the United States. You know, what can we expect going forward?

But Renad, good to have you with us, and very keen to hear your views. You’ve been, obviously, a long time doing work on all parts of Iraq, from the States to also, understanding the hybrid non-state actors. But also, you know, beyond their role, I’d be keen to hear, you know, firstly, you know, what’s Iraq’s position in this conflict?

The Government is, as Elham pointed out, taking a bit more of a hardline stance and, of course, we’ve seen groups in Iraq attacking US entities and forces in the region in a provocative manner. Are they ab – how are the operating, in co-ordination, independently? How are they connected to the Axis of Resistance, and, you know, what does that say more broadly about these groups’ relationships and connectivity with Hamas and Hezbollah and the Houthis?

And, you know, as someone who’s been looking at the roots and growth of these groups, you know, what can we understand, not just through the prism of Iraq, but, you know, how does the op – the Axis operate? You know, is it a concert orchestrated by Tehran, or is there a bit more agency in this model? Looking forward to hearing what you have to say.

Dr Renad Mansour

How long are you giving me for all those questions?

Dr Sanam Vakil

No, you can take whatever you want. These are all the things that, like, buzz in my mind…

Dr Renad Mansour

Oh, no.

Dr Sanam Vakil

…every day.

Dr Renad Mansour

Thanks. I guess – I mean, it’s been fascinating listening and I guess, you know, it’s diff – more difficult to talk about Iraq like you would. Like Elham was mentioning Qatar and Saudi Arabia as a, sort of, more coherent foreign policy establishments. I mean, Iraq, of course, like Lebanon, other countries, suffers from this Frankenstein makeup of politics, less, sort of, centralised, less coherent, at least, let’s say, and therefore, often becoming more of a playground. And I think the conversation on Iraq or Syria or Lebanon thus far has been part of this wider concern on regional escalation and, you know, whether there’s going to be more war in the re – you know, acro – outside of what Israel’s already – and Palestine, what’s happening in Israel and Palestine.

And I think one of the challenges with that, I’ll get to Iraq’s position from the government, but one of the challenges has been, I think, a conflation of the – many of these groups and how connected they actually are. And particularly the connection with Hamas and the other, sort of, transnational groups that are known as the Axis of Resistance, you know, allied to Iran, whether in Iraq, Syria or Hezbollah in Lebanon. Very clearly, you know – and Tareq Baconi and others have done really good work on Hamas, working on this idea of the equilibrium of violence, and that’s been shattered in between Hamas and Israel, that violence. The, kind of, understanding of how violence is used is, since 7 October, been shattered.

What hasn’t been shattered is – thus far, is that same equilibrium of violence between Hezbollah and Lebanon and Israel, or these popular organisation forces groups and Israel, and that is to say that there has been a logic of violence that many of these Axis of Resistance groups use. However, that logic thus far, and for several years, has been yes to strike, but not necessarily for a massive intention to kill. Most of these strikes don’t kill. Now, there’s a debate whether they’re – you know, there’s a capability issue or an intent issue, but certainly, there has been – there hasn’t been an appetite to escalate, and there many reasons for this.

One of – one big reason is if you look at these armed groups in Iraq or, you know, even Hezbollah and Lebanon elsewhere, is they have their own domestic issues and public authority that they’re more concerned with, much more than what happens in Palestine, right, in real political terms. They’re going through a legitimacy crisis themselves, right, which means that they have economic constraints, they have – they’re fighting elections, they’re fighting each other for power in these countries. This is their priority. They’re not going to send everyone to escalate right now, unless something, of course, changes, and that’s been very clear.

But linked to this, and this is where I think you start hearing the, kind of, tone of escalation, is this is an important cause for these groups because they have been losing legitimacy. They’re less able to use sectarianism or nationalism, or even reformism and anti-corruption, to convince their popu – their public, their – you know, their publics, their social bases, to support them. So, you’ve seen, whether it’s Hezbollah and Lebanon, or the PMF groups in Iraq or more widely, a, kind of, legitimacy gap that the Israel – you know, Palestine-Israel conflict is – either they’re hoping to use to regain, to say, “We support.”

And so, I guess what I’m saying, to, kind of, be short on this, is it’s an ideal – it’s a way to instrumentalise the conflict for a home audience, but without an actual appetite to risk the status quo and their internal competition. But I think this is really important. We cannot conflate Hamas, a Sunni, originally Muslim Brotherhood, organisation that went against many of these Axis of Resistance groups in the Syria War, they, you know, they sided with the opposition, with these groups that are allied with Iran. The popularisation forces and Hezbollah, a) which are Shia and ideology does matter to some extent here, but b) who are also pragmatic and fighting in their own arenas, and unless something drastically changes, will continue to do that. Of course, even the Vanguard Networks here that we look at would do that.

So, this all leads to, sort of, Iraq’s position, and, you know, I think the conversations on Egypt or on the Gulf and many countries, I think it’s very hard to look at Iraq as actually having a mediating role, of course, right? It’s been a week, it’s gone through decades of conflict, but, you know, Elham mentioned, for example, the deal in China between Saudi Arabia and Iran. That all began in Baghdad, right? That process of bringing together Saudis and Iranians began in Baghdad and I think it’s because Iraq represents a, kind of, unique or distinct position in the region, in that you have Americans, you have Iranians, you have Gulf, you have Turks, you have all of these regional, you know, powers and global powers, but interacting with each other, right?

And that’s why there was this ability to broker, initially, talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and that’s why, for example, Blinken, the – you know, Secretary Blinken, went to Baghdad to meet the Iraqi Prime Minister, and the next day, the Pri – the Iraqi Prime Minister, Mohammed Shia’ Al Sudani, went to Tehran, where he saw Khamenei in the Iranian rec – leadership. So, it does serve this – it does have this function of a connector, at least, you know.

And so, the conversation, therefore, I think, if we start to think about what is best for a settlement, is, you know, if we understand that there isn’t an appetite for regional escalation, and keep in mind the US have just renewed their waivers that allows Iran to give energy to Iraq, so on both – we haven’t – we’ve seen a, kind of, non-appetite for escalation, what should the conversation actually be?

The conversation should be, how do we turn a country like Iraq, or others, not as a playground, but as a convening spot, potentially, or how do we contribute, right? Because there are players that are connected to Baghdad that need to be connected to any political settlement, so what when we move past the military solution and we go to the stages of political settlement, it can be more comprehensive, but also, begin to push issues of accountability in there. But that’s getting ahead, I think, of where we are right now.

But I think that’s what – so, the Iraqi Government, you know, to do this all in very – in one sentence, I’d say the Iraqi Government wants a ceasefire, first and foremost, and also, to, kind of, de-escalate.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Thanks, Renad. I think you bring up a really key issue about the role that Iraq can play as – exactly as you’ve said, not a playground, but perhaps a convenor, kind of, like Chatham House, where it could bring all of the relevant parties, but also, the hybrid non-state actors together. And I think buy-in from those groups and accountability, as you mentioned, is certainly going to be part of – it needs to be part of what comes next. It isn’t necessarily a guarantee.

I want to take a moment and bring in some of the questions from the audience, ‘cause there are some – a long list of questions and very good questions that I want to direct specifically to each of you. And let me first start with you, Mirette. There are a few questions for you, and I’ll give you a few minutes to pick them apart. From Muriel Asseburg from SWP as to how far “weapons smuggling via Egypt to Gaza has had a negative effect on Egyptian-Israeli relations,” if you could pick that up.

Secondly, from David Butter of Chatham House, “Are there any clues about any, sort of, debate within the Egyptian establishment, Sisi, the GIS military intel army Ministry of Finance, Prime Minister? What options for more active engagement, or differences within the establishment? Does a truce potentially provide a trigger for Egypt to get more involved politically? So, maybe you want to share some views on those issues.

Mirette F. Mabrouk

Okay, thank you. So, weapons smuggling, not really, for the following reason. One of the criticisms that has been levelled at Egypt over the years, not without reason, is that Egypt contributed to the penning in of Gaza, because there is – there are two entrances, one on the Israeli side and one on the Egyptian side. So, the Egyptians also are on the other end of that blockade. Now, they do open the border fairly regularly. They do allow people in and out for – people and goods in and out, but they have also imposed closures, at various times, that have been problematic.

Now, the weapons smuggling, I mean, Egypt destroyed hundreds of tunnels, because you want to bear in mind that the weapons smuggling goes both ways, right? It’s not just weapons going in from Egypt. It’s weapons coming into Egypt that have been detrimental for Egypt in its battle with Islamist extremists. So, no, it hasn’t really had an adverse effect on relations with Israel. It’s had an adverse re – effect on relations with Hamas, but not really with Israel, because the Israelis know that it is in Egypt’s interests to control weapons smuggling through those tunnels.

Now, more active engagement and more engagement politically, it depends what you mean by “more engagement politically.” First of all, agreement on this subject is – I mean, it’s fairly homogenous. The President’s office, the military, the security forces, everybody pretty much agrees on the way forward with this, so, no. When you say to be “more active” politically, if what’s been referred to as the Egyptian role in a post-conflict Gaza, which, you know, people keep – what mostly the West keeps bringing up. The Egyptian answer to that is actually the same as the rest of the Arabs, there will be no involvement in a post-conflict Gaza and anything – and in any role that is not supportive or not humanitarian, or there will be no admin – Egyptian administration in Gaza. There will be – not by the Egyptians, not by any of the Arabs. I think the Jordanian Foreign Minister put it well when he said, basically, “The Israelis want someone else to clean up their own mess,” and that’s not going to happen.

For the Egyptians to be involved in Gaza afterwards is going to put them in the role of occupiers. As with the rest, that is not going to happen, alright? So, what the Egyptians – and again, there is consensus on this, I was just speaking to several UN Ambassadors, there is consensus on this, what needs to happen is that the Palestinians need to be involved in Gaza. The PLA needs to be involved. However, there is direct and fairly aggressive opposition to this from the Israelis. In fact, the PLA Foreign Minister was not allowed to go to the last meeting on this in Brussels.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Thank you, Mirette. Elham, there are a few questions pertaining to the Gulf that I want to pick up and give you an opportunity to answer. Firstly, I have one from Sandra Khadhouri, sorry for the name mispronunciation. “Are Gulf states calling for the release of Israeli hostages and the end to Hamas attacks on Israel, and if not, why not? How could a one-sided mediation possibly work in this situation when there are two sides in this war?”

Secondly, bear with me as I scroll down, from Maurizio Milani. “Do you think the Gulf countries may contribute to a peace and reconstruction plan, together with the UN, US, EU, IFI and other likeminded, including perhaps China, in which there could also be compensation and incentives in order to evacuate settlers from the West Bank, or at least a large part of them, and allow a viable Palestinian state, as well as compensation to Palestinian refugees to overcome the right of return?” That’s a big one, but it picks up on, perhaps, some of the forward thinking that might or might not be underway in the countries that you’ve already spoken about. So, if you don’t mind picking up those issues.

Elham Fakhro

Sure. So, the Gulf states are not in any way endorsing what Hamas did. I don’t want to – that impression to be there. The ones that have spoken out most forcefully against Hamas are the UAE and Bahrain, but in general, there has been a condemnation and very much an acknowledgement that what Hamas did was mistaken and barbaric and so on, on 7 October. So, I don’t think that’s in question.

Can they contribute to a peace and reconstruction plan? Yes, absolutely. I think that’s where, you know, the thinking lies right now. So, being in D.C., I have heard proposals being made about, you know, bringing a number of Arab states together, along with the United States and Israel, in some kind of contact group, to set the stage, at least for continued conversations at the moment. And leading the way towards a more sustained solution to bring the Arab states into some kind of broader dialogue around this.

So, there’s all kinds of proposals and plans that are circulating ideas at this point, only that are circulating, but I think there are some unknowns. The unknowns include what is Israel trying to accomplish beyond its very general goal of eliminating Hamas? What is Israel willing to do, once there is a ceasefire eventually? And even within the Israeli political discourse, there’s been mixed messaging. So, from the settler movement, there’s been talk of bringing settlers back into Gaza. There’s been talk of establishing a very wide buffer zone and pushing civilians into the South and keeping them more in the South, than having more of a buffer in the North. There’s been talk of bringing the Palestinian Authority back to Gaza.

So, I think there are, unfortunately, more questions than answers in terms of what is Israel willing to – what is its gameplan, what is it, you know, willing to do? And then, on the next – kind of, related to that is what the Arab states would be willing to support or not support based on all of these different scenarios. I think – I mean, from the Arab side, what they’d like to see is actually clear. They’ve been clear about wanting a two-state solution and a diplomatic resolution to the conflict.

What that means is, of course, some way of rolling back the many, many settlements in the West Bank. And again, very tricky to do, not at all easy. It’s figuring out governance in Gaza. I don’t think Israel is going to be willing to tolerate a Hamas Government there in the future, so what do you do with it? Do you just plug in the PA? That’s not as easy as some would like it to be, or as it sounds. But I think what’s easier, possibly, is a, kind of, a reconstruction plan in the aftermath, where you have some kind of fund being created to plan for reconstruction, the Gulf states could have a role in that. Again, it’s not clear whether they’d be willing to just pour in money. What Gulf officials often do say is, “We’re not an ATM and don’t see us that way.” So, funding reconstruction on what terms is also another question? Would Israel be willing to allow materials? And it hasn’t allowed in the past sufficient materials for reconstruction, during – after past wars, you know, 2014 and so on. What was destroyed then was never fully rebuilt.

So, I’m – you know, I don’t want to add more questions to the list, but I think it’s immensely, immensely complicated and there’s so many moving parts. The hope is that yes, immediately after you do have some kind of momentum for diplomacy and that can move things forward. There is a role for the Gulf states, certainly. For the Arab states in general, there’s a huge role, countries like Egypt, especially, and figuring out how that works is the challenge.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Thank you, Elham, and you’re right to raise the questions. I think the reality is that we all have many questions and there haven’t been very public, clear answers about what’s to come. And, of course, that is enhancing regional insecurity in the – in this moment and going forward.

Renad, there is a question for you from Hadani Ditmars about how you see “the situation playing out in terms of Sadr’s and other militias, in their ongoing attacks on US bases?” And he follows it up with, you know, “Is this more about their own agency and their own political agendas, or is there, you know, broad and real concern for the Palestinian cause in Iraq?”

Dr Renad Mansour

I mean, unfortunately, I think that many of these groups and governments in the region haven’t put the Palestinian cause on the list of their priorities. I mean, if you look at the last 16 years, you know, the siege and blockade in Gaza, every now and then, there would be a leader who would say something, but there wasn’t – it was not a priority. It was not seen as – you know, the violence that Palestinians have gone through is being instrumentalised now by these groups, certainly, and Israel, of course, is a convenient external enemy for them to use to try and address their own issues. But, you know, as I said in my opening remarks, I think that these groups are anti-Israel. They’re anti – sort of, you know, they claim to be anti-colonial, anti – you know, the Resistance. This is what they say, but that’s more of being anti-Israel than fundamentally pro-Palestinian.

And this actually puts them at odds with their populations, right, and just like in all the countries. The challenge that many Iraqis have, for example, is from the time of Saddam Hussein their leaders have been fighting the cause of Palestine, but at the same time, not serving them. So, it’s a very complicated, you know, question to talk about, especially – you know, and I think this conversation is important to note that we don’t know what the end of this looks like, right?

On one hand, you have the UN and many senior UN people, saying, “This could turn into a genocide,” right, “if not yet.” So, we don’t know where this is going to end up. We don’t know how many will be there. We hope that if there’s a ceasefire, we hope that it ends, but we don’t know where this ends up, and that has implications.

We’ve seen in Iraq. Iraq for 20 years is an example of where a military solution, with a political settlement that doesn’t actually take into account the people’s voices, or one – or the different sides, will only explode once again. And I think, you know, the case of Israel-Palestine is another example of this. So, it’s very difficult to think of the day after here, but certainly, to go back to answering this question, these groups are instrumentalising this for – at the moment, for domestic audiences.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Thank you, Renad. Back to you, Mirette. A number of questions and some of them just to reinforce, I think, some points that you’ve already made. There is a question from Tony Zellinger. “‘Til 1967, Gaza was under the Egyptian administration. So, as we advance, could it be merged with Egyptian land close to the Mediterranean to create a viable subregion and political entity?” I feel like you’ve said that, but I think it’s important to get that out there. Neil Brown asks about, “How does this play into the upcoming election in Egypt?” You know, “Is this going to make a fac – be a factor at all?” And, you know, could you veer into where you also kicked us off and talk about how and why you see Israel’s strategy or policy with Egypt as being shortsighted? You know, what are the Israelis missing? Their normalisation and peace with Israel is the longest standing and, you know, one would argue, also the most pronounced? You know, what are they missing in, sort of, pushing this policy?

Mirette F. Mabrouk

The question on Gaza being merged with Egyptian land and becoming “a viable political entity,” and I quote, the very short answer to this is no, alright? The longer answer to that is what you’re talking about is a mass expulsion of a people. That’s what you’re talking about there and that’s the – it’s not new. The Israelis have had it on the table for about 50 years and it’s been categorically refused by everybody, okay? Because, and this is the important thing, the Palestinians don’t want Egyptian land. What they want is their own land. What they want is their own homeland. They don’t want to be shoved out somewhere else, alright? And we can talk about this for a very, very long time, but I don’t think we’ve – we – and I know we don’t have the time, but the short answer to that is, no, absolutely not.

How does this play into the elections? I don’t think it is possible to overstate the importance of this, of public opinion at the moment to the Egyptian administration and to the President, okay? Palestine has always been somewhat of a litmus test for Arab populations to – it plays off against local discontent. Now, that doesn’t mean that if everyone is happy, they don’t care about the Palestinians, no, but the – it does tend to have a multiplying factor. And the administration, the President, is extremely aware of this, okay?

If Egypt is perceived to be letting down the Palestinians badly, it will go badly at home. Now, the Egyptian Government has a very low tolerance for public displays of expression for, you know, public demonstrations. It has allowed some demonstrations, but it is very, very conscious that things could get out of hand. So, what happens is going to be of immense importance to the upcoming elections, that’s one.

Why did I call it shortsighted? The Abraham Accords, I think, solidified relations that had been ongoing for a while before everyone sat down and signed a piece of paper. Elham will know much more about this than I do, but the relative security of the region, the relative peace that Israel has been living in, not counting its internal problems, which it has to manage on its own, but the relative security in the region, honestly, is a direct result of the Camp David Accords. Once Egypt signed on, okay, and once Egypt made peace with Israel in 1977, no-one else was going to attack it, alright? But to maintain that regional peace, Egypt has to be secure.

Israel has pushed and pushed and pushed for Palestinians to be pushed into Egypt. It has had the US try and ask, it has had various European countries try and ask, and you have to remember that Egypt is currently in the middle of its worst economic crisis in about 60 years, and on the table was debt relief. Now, when a country that is in its worst economic crisis in 60 years has debt relief in front of it and consistently says no, you should probably pay attention. Because what that means is there is an opportunity cost, and the opportunity cost is not worth it, okay? If the domestic security of Egypt is shaken, it is – it’s probably impossible to overstate what that would mean to the direct security of Israel. So, it is not in Egy – in Israel’s interests to push Egypt beyond its limits, it just isn’t.

But I think that what’s happening now in Israel, and again, not an – I’m not an expert on Israeli politics, but I do think that at the moment, there is so much happening that the current government and particularly the Prime Minister, is scrambling, looking only right at the – you know, underneath his feet. Trying to maintain power, trying to maintain their position, trying to juggle the feelings of an extremely angry, you know, with reason, Israeli public, and is possibly not giving this the attention that it deserves, but he – they absolutely have to.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Thank you so much, Mirette. Elham, back to you and a few questions coming at you. One from Sam Darga, “Saudi Arabia and Iran appear to be on the same page for now. Might that change if the conflict widens, particularly with the, sort of, activities that the Houthis are taking?” Do you see Saudi Arabia and Iran on the same page? Let me just throw that one in. Tim Read asks an interesting question, “To what extent are governments in the region feeling pressure or danger of being overthrown from engaging in The Abraham Accords or getting friendlier with Israel and decreasing their effective support for the Palestinians?”

And let me just give you one more while we’re at it, and I think this is important, as well. From Justin Alexander, “How is the co-operation between Gulf states evolving as the War in Gaza drags on?” Noting visits by the Qatari Emir, or Prime Minister, to the UAE and Bahrain. Has this been an opportunity for Gulf states to work together more effectively?

Elham Fakhro

Great questions. So, the first one on Saudi-Iran and – Saudi Arabia, sorry, and Iran being on the same page. Yes, I think in some ways, they are on the same page in terms of not really wanting an escalation. I think Iran, we’ve seen with Hassan Nasrallah’s speeches and Iran’s posturing in general, is – has been to avoid much of an escalation in terms of taking this conflict out of Gaza. There is activity, obviously, on the Hezbollah – on the, sorry, Lebanon-Israel border, but it hasn’t gone much beyond that yet. So, I think, for now, that’s – that is the positive news, that it remains contained. But again, as long as this continues – the longer it goes on for, the more you do have a chance of a regional escalation. But I think it was positive to see leaders from the two states side-by-side at the Summit. That’s good news for the region and for Saudi Arabia and Iran to at least have these channels and broadly be on the same page.

The pressures of – public pressures. Being overthrown I think is a bit of – it’s a bit too much. I think the country we’re talking about here, the most is Bahrain, which has signed The Abraham Accords in spite of a lot of public and popular pressure against that, in spite of having a very active population. Now, there have been protests in Bahrain every weekend since 7 October, calling for a ceasefire, calling for the government to walk back on The Accords, to cut its diplomatic and economic ties with Israel. The government has not done that. In fact, Bahrain’s leaders have been outspoken in, kind of, reiterating that – I think the last statement was that they “don’t want to use The Accords for public posturing,” or something like that.

But no, there’s definitely a tension there and I think, yes, the longer this goes on for, again, the more that tension is going to simmer. I don’t think that there’s a risk of an overthrow, though, because Bahrain’s Government has survived much more significant pressures during the Arab Spring. And I think the protests we’re seeing, while very meaningful and significant, aren’t really a challenge to the system itself, but it is a rift and I think it can contribute to other pressures down the line and create a general mood of instability, which Bahrain suffers from in general.

Now, co-operation between Gulf states evolving, yes, I think that’s an opportunity, for sure. It’s one of the few, possibly, silver linings with all of this is that it can increase co-operation between Gulf states, not only Gulf states, Arab states, as well. It can create momentum for joint efforts and I think that that is certainly one of the few positives that can come out of this.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Thank you, Elham. Renad, I want to turn to you and bring you in and ask you about the role of the United States. There is a question out there and I think it’s an important one, by Emmanuel Abegunrin, sorry for the name mispronunciation, asking about “the role of the US as an honest broker.” And, of course, the US has played a long role in Iraq since the…

Dr Renad Mansour

Yeah.

Dr Sanam Vakil

…2003 invasion. So, you know, how do you see the role of the US in the region right now? And let’s tie it to the, sort of, bigger, overarching question that I know you’ve been thinking about, about the implications of this moment, this war, on the global order. You know, what are your thoughts on this issue? And I do want to come back to Mirette and Elham, as well, thinking about the way forward beyond the region. You know, who do you think are brokers and how – can those brokers be honest brokers? We’ve heard Aaron David Miller actually say that “The US has been Israel’s Lawyer in past negotiations.” So, who can be the honest broker going forward, if anyone?

Dr Renad Mansour

I mean, I think I would take a more realist interpretation of international relations. The role of countries is not honesty, but to serve their own national interests, or at least let’s say perceived national interests. So, this idea of honesty is not – you know, it’s a construction of a liberal-based international system to fit, you know, a post-World War Two, kind of, timeframe. Where there was this idea of global nihilism or these neoliberal and liberal institutions from the West were going around the world, setting up coup d’états against Soviets and saying that “Democracies promote democracies and this is honesty.”

I mean, I think many people in the region, especially in Iraq, would probably tell you that they haven’t really felt the international rules-based order and, of course, today, you know, Palestinians have felt this for a long time, too, and many others in the region. So – but what’s – what I think is shifting, if we get away from this idea of honesty and more towards, you know, this rules-based order, and, you know, the purpose of the rules-based order was to justify US hegemony, right? It was a, kind of, a way to say, “Yes, we will invade, but we will bring you democracy.” Yes, you know, and so, that’s fine. I mean, they pursued their national interest – well, it’s not fine, but they pursued their national interests based on that realism.

What’s happened now is the US doesn’t seem to have the same amount of influence in the region with many of the – with these countries, as it had, you know, when it was more of like people call the ‘unipolar world’, or this, sort of, hegemon, this hegemonic power. I mean, that’s waning, partly because of this decision to move away from the region, based on an assumption that because you don’t have direct violence and you don’t have, you know, these civil wars anymore, mission accomplished, right? But that quick, sort of, jumping to mission accomplished and moving elsewhere has hurt the US’s influence, as well, in many of these regions.

And this assumption that one-sided pieces or pieces that, like, so – you know, aren’t – don’t bring about accountability to the lives of people, that’s where, you know, that’s where the honesty question needs to be asked, and that’s where we need to start thinking about this. I think it’s right that the US, you know, is supporting Israel, for very pragmatic reasons. Who else is going be the US’s military ally in this region, like Israel, right? I mean, this is the bene – the basis is both the ideological, but also, the, sort of, pragmatic reasons for this.

So, I think especially in the context of Ukraine, many people across the region are asking why those same arguments that the US and the UK were making for Ukraine, in defence of Ukraine, aren’t being applied in this case. And I think that is be – leading many to question, or exposing to many, that honesty, that, you know, that fundamentally underpinned this rule-based order.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Thank you very much, Renad, and I want to give Mirette and Elham some – a quick opportunity to perhaps comment on the role of the US. But Mirette, I also want to ask you about that West Bank, ‘cause we haven’t really been able to touch on the tensions and the violence in the West Bank, as well. You know, how worried are you about what’s going on over there with the rise in deaths and the violence? Could this lead to a broader, sort of, conflict, as well? And feel free to pick up on any final points you’d like.

Mirette F. Mabrouk

Thank you. So, yes, yes and yes. I think that what’s happening in Gaza means that people have taken their eyes off the West Bank. And what’s happening in the West Bank at the moment is that settlers, already significantly prone to violence, are now being supported by the IBF. Last I heard, there were over 300 people killed in the West Bank. It’s – what’s happening has been referred to by one Israeli activist as, “The most successful land grab since 1967.” There are over half a million settlers there and consistently, what’s happening is that, often supported by the IBF, or at the very, very least, ignored by the IBF, settlers will go in, terrify or kill Palestinians, particularly the Bedouin, and just take over their land.

It is very, very likely that if this is not brought in check by the Israelis, it could lead to greater violence. And you want to bear in mind that a few weeks – a couple of weeks ago, the Finance Minister, the extremely right-wing Smotrich, wanted to deny the PLA and the West Bank the taxes collected for them by the Israelis. And it was the Defence Minister who stepped up and said, “They have to have that money, because otherwise, what we’re looking at is an explosion on the West Bank,” alright? So, thank heavens there was someone there to counter the other point of view.

So, yes, I’m extremely worried about the West Bank. I think everyone is worried about the West Bank. I don’t know that the government wants to rein in the settlers at the moment, but again, I do think it’s shortsighted, in that if it is not taken in hand at the moment, there – it will be very, very difficult to rein them in afterwards and you are looking at, yes, a bigger conflict.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Thank you, Mirette, for weighing in on that important issue, and lastly, Elham, over to you. If you – you’re – I know you’ve also been in Washington and perhaps you have some thoughts that you might want to share about the role of the US and what role it can play, going forward. But I do want to throw one more in there ‘cause I’m a bit greedy. Do you think that there’s been a collective diplomatic failure by Arab states in allowing this situation to be overlooked in Palestine? Why wasn’t there more regional investment in peace processes?

Elham Fakhro

Yeah, it’s a great question, Sanam. So, basically, I mean, six weeks ago, the Palestinian problem, you know, was the one that no-one wanted to deal with. The Accords were, kind of, built off of that in many ways. The United States turned its diplomatic attention towards expanding normalisation between Israel and the Arab states. That’s where the diplomatic capital from the United States went, rather than solving the real issue at hand, which has been between Israel and the Palestinians. That’s where Arab efforts also went.

And so, from both sides, not to mention from Israel, the idea was that, you know what? This Palestinian issue is unsolvable, it’s not deserving of much political capital. Let’s focus on something else that is actually going to yield results. And unfortunately, what we’re seeing now, in terms of this huge escalation and crisis, is, in part, a result of that. It’s the result of no diplomatic capital being, you know, offered to tackle the real problem. And so, if there is anything to be said here, any change that has to happen, it’s for this to come back to the top of the agenda for every actor involved in the region and in the US and to really push to try and make some diplomatic traction there. And again, this is, then, a bipartisan problem. It started with the Trump administration, but Biden continued with exactly the same approach.

And so, what I will also say is I think I do want to point out that Saudi Arabia now does have leverage because of the talks that were taking place prior to 7 October, with Israel. Saudi Arabia, in some way, does want a deal, so does Israel, and Saudi Arabia has been willing to raise the Palestinian issue in the context of these talks. So, I think that’s where I do see a little bit of room for some traction to happen. Again, just trying to find some openings in a situation where it’s very difficult to do so. So, yeah, there needs to be a rethinking on the importance of this in the United States, as well. Is the US willing to take more of an assertive role towards pushing for diplomatic momentum, which has been dead for so long? Is Israel willing to be receptive to that, is the other question? And so, that’s – yeah.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Thank you, Elham. Those key questions are certainly ones we’re going to pick up in the next few weeks, as we continue our series and our – continue these discussions. Everyone is, you know, working overtime to make sense of what’s happening and draw attention to the different dynamics of this war and the tragedy unfolding in Gaza and in Israel and across the region, more broadly. Ultimately, bringing greater attention to the lost issue of Palestine, I think, is a huge opportunity.

And thank you for all of your time, your insight, your analysis. Mirette, Elham, Renad, we really appreciate you sharing your views and being here with us today and look forward to continuing the engagement. Thank you everyone who’s joined us over the course of this past hour, and please tune in again to further discussions here at Chatham House. Thank you, everyone.

Mirette F. Mabrouk

And thank you, Sanam.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Bye, bye.

Dr Renad Mansour

Thanks again. Bye, everyone.