Faisal Al Yafai
Full house [pause]. We have the microphones on. Are the microphones on? Yes? No?
Staff
Yes.
Faisal Al Yafai
Yes, wonderful. Ladies and gentlemen, hello. Look at this full house. I was asking the panellists earlier whether they thought we would get a, you know, a big crowd, and I wonder, is it because you – you’re not sure what will happen in the Middle East this year?
Staff
No, that’s right.
Faisal Al Yafai
Is it not obvious? If you’ll give me a minute, I just need to make sure that we have everything in place, and then we will start. Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to Chatham House. If we had been having this conversation, let’s say, just before Christmas, I don’t think you would have foreseen that the greatest protest in years would have started in Iran. I don’t think you would have foreseen that as we speak today, Kurdish has been a nat – made a national language in Syria. I don’t think any of these things would have been foreseen, and I think that’s why, part of the reason, you can tell me, hopefully, in the questions, but I think that’s part of the reason why there are so many of you in the room tonight.
This year then, and I think it’s reflected in the first few weeks of news, has given us a sense of what this dynamically changing Middle East might look like in 2026, and that is why to make sense of the landscape and the contours of that new Middle East, we have this wonderful panel with us. A few notes before we start, because the discussion is being held on the record. I think we have a lot of Journalists in the room. Some of you are already writing. What are you writing that I’ve said? So, you already started. The Middle East will be – yeah. It’s being recorded and livestreamed. The audience at home, or wherever you are in the world, you can ask questions via the Q&A box, and then I’ll read them out a little bit later when we come to the questions. Lastly, I encourage you, if you are on Twitter or on X, or any other platform, if you want to tweet your thoughts, you can do so using the hashtag @CH_MENAP, that’s @CH_MENAP.
I’m Faisal Al Yafai, for those of you who don’t know, from New Lines Magazine, and the host of The Lede podcast. Joining me today on the panel are Dr Sanam Vakil, Director of the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House, Dr Renad Mansour, Senior Research Fellow in the Middle East and North Africa Programme, and the Director of the Iraq Initiative, Tim Eaton, Senior Research Fellow in the Middle East and North Africa Programme, and Galip Dalay, Senior Consulting Fellow for the Turkey Initiative in the Middle East. Ladies and gentlemen, the panel, all of you, welcome to Chatham House [applause]. Thank you.
I thought we would start with a scene-setting question, because it seems to me that the end of 2025 has left a lot of threads unresolved in the Middle East. It’s not as if all of the many conflicts came to a neat conclusion. We have the purported end of the Gaza War, the Iraq-Israel conflict, this potential upcoming disarmament of…
Galip Dalay
Iran.
Dr Sanam Vakil
Iran-Israel.
Galip Dalay
Iraq is okay now.
Faisal Al Yafai
Ah, it’s hard to remember sometimes. The Iran-Israel conflict, the coming Iraq conflict, the potential disarmament of Hezbollah in Lebanon, the various skirmishes in Syria, and I was going to say about the election in Iraq being unfinished, but I’m not going to now. So, I’m going to start with a scene setter for each person on the panel, and the question is, what do you think will be the most important dynamic to watch this year? We’ll start with you, Sanam.
Dr Sanam Vakil
Well, thank you, Faisal, for being here, and thank you, everyone, for coming. It’s obvious what the most important question or issue right now, in the region, at least from my vantage point, and that’s the unanswered question of Iran. We’ve seen powerful protests for a number of weeks, we’ve seen a very violent and brutal crackdown by an aggressive state that I have long been saying is facing a legitimacy crisis, and, of course, it’s abundantly clear…
Faisal Al Yafai
Hmmm.
Dr Sanam Vakil
…Iran is facing external pressure, from Israel, the United States, it’s under maximum pressure of sanctions. But it’s facing also an internal crisis, and they’re converging, and have converged, specifically over the past two weeks, that this is a government that does limp on and does survive, but it’s wounded and it’s unclear what the scenarios and trajectories will be. I think the Islamic Republic is certainly morphing into, you know, perhaps a new phase that is more brutal, that’s certainly more repressive. It has been weakened and battered across the region, really not being aware that October 7th was a catalyst and a ch – sea change for Israel in – and over two years, we have watched Israel take down various parts of the axis of resistance. Iran has seen the loss of its longstanding partner in Syria. Donald Trump has taken out its partnership with Venezuela. So, this is a regime that is on the back foot.
Faisal Al Yafai
And do you think that we will see a resolution to it or a new phase this year?
Dr Sanam Vakil
I would venture to say that this year will be the most consequential year for the Islamic Republic. There will be either a transition from within or forced transition on the Islamic Republic.
Faisal Al Yafai
Yeah.
Dr Sanam Vakil
Where Donald Trump is, I think, trying to force submission and, you know, put pressure, maximum pressure, maximum surrender, on the Islamic Republic.
Faisal Al Yafai
Yeah, you’ve used that term, the ‘forced submission”, we’ll come back to it ‘cause I want to ask you more about it, but let’s keep going with the panel. Renad, what do you think?
Dr Renad Mansour
So, I think for the last few years, the Middle East has been about survival. There’s been a lot of violence, there’s been a lot of suffering, and the regimes in the region have moved to a form of pragmatism just to survive the everyday. And I think that pragmatism will be an important feature here, as you see, for example, with the Gulf states and their policy change towards Iran vis-à-vis the threat of the US attacking Iran in the Gulf, which perhaps, you know, a decade ago, not even, may have been championing regime change in Iran…
Faisal Al Yafai
Right.
Dr Renad Mansour
…are now push – you know, stepping back.
Faisal Al Yafai
Absolutely. I mean, this is – I want to come to, when we talk about Iran, I want to ask you more about that, because it does seem like, again, if we had been having the conversation about the Iran protest a few years ago, you would imagine that the Gulf states, and maybe even Turkey, would not have been the ph…
Dr Renad Mansour
Yeah.
Faisal Al Yafai
…on the phone to Trump, saying, “Pull back.”
Dr Renad Mansour
Yeah, and the reason for this is because the transformations happening in the Middle East are beyond the control of any single country. The Middle East is intertwined with the global order. It was built by – you know, these countries were made 100 years ago or more through this system and so changes to the global order are being felt in this faultline. And so, the changes with the U – you know, US foreign policy, European foreign policy, even the US-Europe disputes now, will have implications in the Middle East. So, you have these, you know, states in the region that are seeing a world transforming, and transformations are incredibly violent and that’s why we’ve seen so much violence, and I think, you know, although there are hopes for ceasefires, these wars will come back. Ceasefires will not last this year.
Faisal Al Yafai
Okay. Tim.
Tim Eaton
Well, I think picking up from that point that – looking at my focus on Libya and more widely on North Africa, you can, kind of, see some of these distributional impacts of some of those battles, as well. We’re seeing more activist foreign policies from middle powers, from Turkey, from the UAE, and we see in a place like Libya that the local actors are forging alliances and trying to work out the best, you know, calibration of agreements that can – they can pursue their own goals through. And I think that’s almost highlighted where you get, say, Khalifa Haftar, where you have one son that deals with Russia, another son that’s dealing with the US. You have a third son who’s dealing with development spending and with Turkey, principally.
So, all of these players are, kind of, forging relationships, but they’re increasingly complicated, and so, what I’m really looking out for is these ripple effects and some of these perhaps unforeseen consequences. So, I’m sure we’ll get onto talk about conflict later, but if you look at the fallout between the UAE and Saudi, that might already be having an impact in Libya and on Sudan…
Faisal Al Yafai
Yeah.
Tim Eaton
…as a result. So, you know, closing off some of the airspace, different Egyptian policies, which then shift the balance of power within Libya, as well. I think that’s something we’re seeing across the piste, which becomes more and more difficult to, kind of, predict, but, clearly, you see the contradictions in many of these local actors and their international alliances, which are bound to shift.
Faisal Al Yafai
I think that will be – and I imagine the audience will probably find this one of the most interesting parts of the conversation, about the way these middle powers are trying to figure out their way through this new order in the Middle East. And actually, interestingly, Tim, we’ll come back to you, but interestingly, Libya is probably the battleground for a lot of these things but also turned out to be the original petri dish in which these middle powers thought that they could try to get something out of the new government. Let’s keep going. Galip, what do you think about this year? What do you think the most important dynamic will be?
Galip Dalay
Well, I mean, I think probably there will be quite a lot of agreement here in terms of the Iran and developments in Iran will actually fundamentally shape the region. And we have seen very concerted efforts by almost every single regional powers, from the Gulf to Turkey to, in a sense, lobby or to try to dissuade Trump from taking the military action. And I think that in itself is quite telling, because some of these countries ten years ago would be criticising Trump – would be, sorry, criticising Obama for not taking harder stance vis-à-vis Iran, for not being more confrontation with Iran. But now the same states are trying to dissuade Trump from taking an harder stance.
I think the fundamental reason for this is multiple. One of them, the threat perception across the region has fundamentally changed. For many countries in the region, for a long time Iran was one of the fundamental threat perceptions that also brought Gulf state and Israel also closer on many fields, and also that gave birth to many regional initiatives, but since October 7th, this has fundamentally changed. Now you have Iran that is reduced in its power and regional network, and you have Israel that is, like, more and more expansionist, and that is creating, like, you know, a new shared threat perception in the region where the Israel is, in a sense, supressing for many countries, Iran.
And I think that’s the second one, in a sense, what I called the era that started with the Iraq invasion, in which the MENA regional states thought that there was some form of Iran dominance or hegemony or pseudo-hegemony. Not only because Iraq became like a Shia-led government, you have, like, Syria in Assad, the Hezbollah being very powerful in Lebanon. I think now this era is coming to an end. So, in a sense, the idea of an Iran central regional order that was very much came into being with the Iraq invasion, now is being reversed, and I think that is also reducing the threat perception from them. And I think that informs the regional states’ policy [inaudible – 15:08] towards ra –Trump. Unlike in the West or in Israel, they no longer wants to needs the regime change, nor in a sense, the confrontation or the containment of Iran. Rather now they’re more interested in policy back – policy-based rollback of Iran and even co-operating with Iran on certain issues.
Faisal Al Yafai
And you see that as a direct result of the Gaza War?
Galip Dalay
Yes, the main factors is the Gaza War and the original geopolitics that has emerged from this, because, like, you know, what has happened, the degradation of Hezbollah, the – even the toppling of Assad, I would say, like, the two things was very quite fundamental. The Russia being bogged down in Ukraine and Hezbollah being bogged down in Lebanon, and Iran being, you know, being degraded in its power and network, was, I think, one of the major factor for also the fall – the quick fall of Assad regime. Because in the end, it was the Russian air power and then the Hezbollah on the ground that did most of the fighting for quite some times.
Faisal Al Yafai
Okay, let’s go to Iran. I’ll start with you, Sanam, about Iran. Were you surprised that the potential involvement of the US, that it was made in such a – I mean, it seemed like it was really going to happen, and then in the end, it turned out to be, like, a storm in a Shai cup, no?
Dr Sanam Vakil
Well, I think that, you know, there are different dynamics used to describe Donald Trump, you know. The TACO one might apply…
Faisal Al Yafai
Oh, yeah.
Dr Sanam Vakil
…in this circumstance, but I…
Faisal Al Yafai
“Trump Always Chickens Out.”
Dr Sanam Vakil
Yes, but I don’t think that Trump’s forgotten about Iran.
Faisal Al Yafai
But do you think – I mean, you say it, I think, partly as a joke, but do you think that is what happened? Do you think he chickened out at the last minute?
Dr Sanam Vakil
I think a few things converged. First of all, there were not adequate military assets in place. Iran, I think, very clearly messaged directly and indirectly that they would counterstrike. There was no plan for what would come next, not just a war that would clearly end with a further weakening, if not a collapse of the Islamic Republic, but there was no plan for that day after.
Faisal Al Yafai
Right.
Dr Sanam Vakil
And so, you know, probably amidst the lack of a strong opposition, or an alternative inside the country, with lots of lobbying coming from a number of countries in the region, it made sense for the time being to step back. But I don’t, again, think that he has decided to completely move Iran back to the bottom of his to-do list.
Faisal Al Yafai
Hmmm.
Dr Sanam Vakil
I think that there is still an ambition, a hope, for this President, who has consistently said that he’d like to make Iran great again and, you know, distinguish himself from President Carter, President Obama, President Biden. He would like to re-alter the US-Iranian relationship, and it can come through different ways. It could come through the Venezuela reconfiguration of the Islamic Republic, or it could come through an agreement with the Islamic Republic, or, of course, through some sort of other scenario where the system changes, as well.
Faisal Al Yafai
Well, you think it will come through what you’ve called a ‘strategic submission’. This is the idea that Trump or the Americans have is that they want to not topple Iran, but to force it to accept some, sort of, constrained role.
Dr Sanam Vakil
Some constrained role in exchange for the great incentives of American investment, sanctions relief, Tesla factories in the south of Iran, and, you know, this opening up of a frontier economy in the region that has remained closed and of course, obstructed by its own leadership.
Faisal Al Yafai
Well, Renad, what do you think about these Iran protests when you see them viewed from regional states? Because I think we were not the only people taken by surprise by it. I imagine a lot of these regional states were not expecting the scale of protest, and how quickly it morphed, two, three, four weeks and suddenly, the Americans were threatening to use strikes.
Dr Renad Mansour
Yeah, I think, you know, Iraq, the Gulf states, those that are in some ways politically, economically, connected to Iran, change often doesn’t – or often does not lead to a better outcome.
Faisal Al Yafai
Hmmm.
Dr Renad Mansour
I don’t know what the statistics were. I read that 75% or three quarters of times where regime change happened, it didn’t lead to a lawful, better outcome. Now, that’s not to say that this has – what I’m saying does not mean that there should not be regime change or reform, but it just – I think for those who have seen multiple regimes over years, they’ve seen the violence that comes with it.
Faisal Al Yafai
Yeah.
Dr Renad Mansour
And I th – you know, I think Galip’s point is right, that the – you know, October 7th and Israel’s war on Gaza catalysed this threat perception, but there was a soft opening, in a way, between Iran and Saudi Arabia, Iran and the UAE, slowly, even before. I mean, there were talks, initially in Baghdad, and then China, sort of, took the glory there, but also economically, if you look at the geoeconomics, I mean, there was increased activity, both licit and illicit, in this region. So, I think, as I said, from the perspective of the Gulf, you know, who would have often championed a change to what was seen as a Shia…
Faisal Al Yafai
Yeah.
Dr Renad Mansour
…Iranian antagonistic and hegemonic, to some extent, regime after 2003, I think right now, any change like that would be concerning to these countries which share a very small but very important waterway.
Faisal Al Yafai
And part of the reason for that is that you don’t think that the regime can be toppled without a lot of fragmentation. I mean, particularly with Iraq, the region that you study most, there would be a huge influx of refugees across the eastern border.
Dr Renad Mansour
Yeah.
Faisal Al Yafai
That in itself would be problematic for the Irani – for the Iraqis.
Dr Renad Mansour
I think for Iraq now, it’s actually not the, sort of, crux of the problem in the Middle East, it’s not the crux of conflict, and it’s trying to stay out of it as much as possible. And you have what’s happening in Iran, which is, of course, a huge crisis. Iran’s regime is also intertwined with the Iraqi political system, economically, as well. Also, what’s happening in Syria, with, you know, the recent change of leadership over Al-Hawl, and the release of some – or the escape of some ISIS prisoners. I mean, Iraq is seeing what’s happening between – you know, with its neighbours and saying, “This is a massive crisis.”
Faisal Al Yafai
Hmmm.
Dr Renad Mansour
This will be a year of security threats for Iraq…
Galip Dalay
Hmmm hmm.
Dr Renad Mansour
…definitely. So, I think, yeah, while they see – you know, I think at the same time, every leader in the region is happy with the idea that Iran is no longer so hegemonic.
Faisal Al Yafai
Yeah. It’s almost like the point Sanam was making, that you want to weaken it, you want to make sure that Iran has a constrained role, but you don’t want it to have no role at all. You don’t want it to stop functioning as a state, like Iraq did for several years.
Dr Renad Mansour
Yeah, the vacuum there, if there is a vacuum, would be concerning.
Faisal Al Yafai
Would touch every one of its neighbours.
Dr Renad Mansour
Yes, and they are so intertwined that there would be second and third order impacts.
Faisal Al Yafai
Yeah. Galip, let me bring you in on this, because I wonder about when you think about Turkey and how it’s positioning itself on – in these ongoing conflicts, what do you think these recent activities, let’s call them that, mean for its role as a regional power, a great power, but a regional power?
Galip Dalay
Well, I think, I mean, the obvious case in point right now is Syria.
Faisal Al Yafai
Yeah.
Galip Dalay
And I think that Syria is in a sense microcosm through which we can clearly see how Turkey position itself, like, regionally and how Turkey position itself internationally, but also domestically, because the Syria is like domestic politics, regional politics and international politics for Turkey at the same time. I mean, domestically, obviously, one of the major story of 2000 fi – 25 for Turkey was the Kurdish peace process…
Faisal Al Yafai
Hmmm.
Galip Dalay
…but the make and break point of the Kurdish peace process in Turkey was very much Syria. So, now the development in Syria, on the one hand, you know, I mean, obviously the very swift collapse of the SDF or the northeastern Syrian, the autonomy projects, and that was – like, for a long time has been one of the Turkey’s, kind of, red light. So, if this – because just today there was an announcement that there’s a new deal between the SDF and then the Damascus, so if this help and if this crisis somehow, like, it’s managed, I think that will speed up the peace process in Turkey. Because for a long time, the government was saying that the Syria, the integration of SDF into the Syrian state is the precondition for it taking the legal step.
So, if this happens, so if it is resolved, that will speed up this process. Because in – if the SDF remains as a govern – some form of like, you know, a stakeholder in the new governance of Syria or the Kurds, and rather than going the insurgency route, that’s good for Turkey, good for Syria, as well.
Faisal Al Yafai
Hmmm hmm.
Galip Dalay
Secondly, I mean, the – Syria was the deepest crisis of Turkish-American relationship, but now it’s turning into the major place of partnership between these two. I mean, the Syria was the – no other crisis has reshaped the Turkish-American relationship as much as Syria did in negative way, but now you have almost a completely different picture. The Syr – the US’s Special Envoy for Syria is also an Ambassador in Ankara with almost good relation with everyone, with everyone in Turkish establishment. Whereas the Syria was previously the making point with Russian-Turkish relationship, now you no longer hear about Syria. But one point, in terms of regional role, Turkey doesn’t want to be seen in Syria in the same way that Iran was seen during the Assad era, because that will create a counter alignment of the Arab state, so – and therefore, from Turkey’s point of view, Syria turning into the Arab fault is the preferable option…
Faisal Al Yafai
Right.
Galip Dalay
…and potentially – and – not potentially, particularly in co-operation with the Arab Gulf states, like Saudi Arabia. So – and a modus vivendi, an understanding with Saudi Arabia, with Arab Gulf states, is quite key in Turkey’s new vision of Syria, but the major geopolitical point of contestation here is now between Turkey and Israel in Syria.
Faisal Al Yafai
This idea that the Turks were worried about the way that the Arab states would perceive them has been around since the beginning of the Syrian uprising. They were very concerned from the moment the Turks…
Galip Dalay
Hmmm.
Faisal Al Yafai
…looked like they were getting involved. I agree with you, it does seem like they’ve finally figured out this modus vivendi, where the Turks will still be involved, but they won’t necessarily be openly involved.
Galip Dalay
Well, I mean, everyone drew lessons from the development of the last decade or so, particularly since the Arab uprisings. So, I think if there is one lessons from the Middle East in history is the Middle East is not conducive for regional hegemons. So, any pretension for regional hegemony will always, like, create counter-alignment, and I think that’s probably a lesson that everyone should take. And I think that’s – that is a very well received also message in Ankara, I would say. Therefore, right now, if you look at it, even when the Saudi-UAE, the rift is deepening…
Faisal Al Yafai
Yeah.
Galip Dalay
…the role that Turkey is taking, rather than being in a camp, despite the fact that there is more and more convergence between Saudi Arabia and Turkey, from Horn of Africa, to Syria, to Libya, to many places, rather than Turkey throwing itself into a camp, it tried to play the mediation role between the two. Because I think one lesson from this era was the camp politics in the Middle East is usually a quite bad bet to make.
Faisal Al Yafai
Well, we were talking about a ‘regional hegemon’, Tim, what better regional hegemon than Egypt? Egypt has been very quiet. I wonder what you think about the role of the Maghreb more broadly this year, because it surprises me always that, you know, we don’t talk about Egypt, or we talk about Libya only in a very small context, but the rest of North Africa and the Maghreb, we seem to have sidelined.
Tim Eaton
I was thinking about this in the context of this conversation that probably that’s the best outlook for North Africa, that it comes last on the billing in a discussion such as this, but yes, you’re right. I mean, certainly, what we did see across the North African states in 2025 were quite serious social protests in a number of countries, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, even Libya, and clearly major socioeconomic contentions, issues with the social contract. But it looks like those issues largely, have a slightly, you know, more medium to long-term, I think, runway, and certainly, those are major issues that the states are going to have to contend with. And the ability of their economies to provide the jobs and meet the expectations of Moroccans for public services, matched with the high re – high spa – speed rail for the Egyptian economy to be able to manage its debt, but then also to provide social services, I think these are real pertinent challenges.
Faisal Al Yafai
Real pertinent questions, but for those governments. They’re not really pertinent questions for the rest of the region, which seems to be worried about kinetic problems.
Tim Eaton
Well, I think yes and no. I mean, I think one of the really interesting things to look at in Libya over the last few years is that there’s been a dramatic expansion of off-book spending. And so what’s happened there is that effectively, mediated by Turkey and the UAE, there was a deal in the oil sector to bring a new leadership to the Libyan National Oil Corporation, which completely rejigged the flow of funds throughout the Libyan economy and led to dramatic expenditure in the oil sector, perhaps as much as $50 billion extra, kind of, going out the door over a three-year period.
So, some of these deals, which are, kind of, good for the external powers, are also being signed up to by local actors, and that is, certainly in the Libyan case, worsening the situation, and led to a case where, by last year, more money was spent off book than was spent on book…
Faisal Al Yafai
Wow.
Tim Eaton
…which is pretty dramatic. So, probably in 2024, something like $28 billion spent on fuel subsidies and local development, versus 20 billion which went through Libya’s Central Bank. So, that’s pretty fundamental.
Faisal Al Yafai
Another point in Renad’s favour that interventions don’t end well. Right, let’s turn to Gaza, because we’ve been here 20 minutes or so, and we haven’t turned to what was the biggest story last year, the last – sorry, the last two years, the war in Gaza and the future of Palestine. Sanam, I want to go straight into it, because you don’t believe that this ceasefire will hold, and you’ve called the moment that we’re in a ‘temporary holding pattern’ while both sides prepare for a new confrontation. And you still, you maintain that, you think that we will see another confrontation this year?
Dr Sanam Vakil
I think we have been seeing confrontation. We have not called it confrontation, because the powers that be in Washington and elsewhere cannot afford to see this fe – ceasefire formally break. There have been persistent strikes and deaths in Gaza, there is continued violence and harassment in the West Bank. This is a ceasefire in all but name only. And as, you know, Donald Trump is putting together his Board of Peace and creating these institutions that are going to supposedly manage what comes next in a very opaque process, yeah, it’s just very hard to see how this is actually going to benefit Palestinians on the ground, and it’s not still tied to an outcome or an objective of statehood and sovereignty.
Faisal Al Yafai
Yeah. These Boards of Peace, there’s more than one Board of Peace, and it’s nice they found a role for Tony Blair, that’s always welcome. They’ve asked Putin to serve on the board, they’ve asked Erdoğan to serve on the board. We – there’s a lot of people looking for jobs around the world, it seems. What is the link, though? I mean, apart from the, you know, the idea that these boards may not do very much, but what is the link between the boards, however many there are, and what will happen on the ground in Gaza to make life better for Palestinians?
Dr Sanam Vakil
Right. Well, there are various structures, okay? So, the board, you know, can be, sort of, a funding mechanism on the one hand. If you buy your seat on the board, that’s…
Faisal Al Yafai
Funding mechanism…
Dr Sanam Vakil
…a billion…
Faisal Al Yafai
…for whom?
Dr Sanam Vakil
But one billion that goes in and hopefully, will trickle down and help Palestinians, but that mechanism is not particularly clear. There are, of course, a lot of countries that are very worried and cautious about being put on that board, because you don’t know what they’re going to be asked to do, or what they’re going to be held accountable for.
Faisal Al Yafai
Yeah.
Dr Sanam Vakil
And since all of this is being pursued in a very ad hoc way, led by Business Executives rather than real experts, you know, there is just no process to tie to this.
Faisal Al Yafai
Hmmm hmm.
Dr Sanam Vakil
And, you know, people that have currently said yes are not, you know, anyone from Western governments, the French have said no, we don’t know what the British…
Faisal Al Yafai
I think Belarus has said yes.
Dr Sanam Vakil
Yes, and so have the Hungarians, and we will see, but, you know…
Faisal Al Yafai
Myanmar very shortly.
Dr Sanam Vakil
Yes.
Faisal Al Yafai
It’s really problematic. I mean, I know we’re, kind of, joking about it, and I see the people in the audience laughing, as well, ‘cause it is, you know, it’s, kind of, black humour, but do you think this year there will be any move towards getting these Palestinians out of tents and into a liveable situation?
Dr Sanam Vakil
I don’t know. I would love to say yes, and I would love to cling to that prospect and be hopeful. It’s very hard in this moment where everything is so chaotic, that there isn’t process, that bureaucracies are, you know, working hard behind the scenes, but, you know, the ideas are not fully – filling up into plans. It’s – you know, this is a very reactive and chaotic moment, and I would strongly encourage Western governments and Western policymakers to not outsource every file in the region, particularly this file, just to Donald Trump.
Faisal Al Yafai
Just to Donald Trump, yeah.
Dr Sanam Vakil
There needs to be a marshalling of support from Europe, from the UK, but also for Middle Eastern governments. It’s time to bring Gaza and the crisis in Palestine back on the agenda, and it’s not that we can just focus on Iran one week, Greenland the next week, and, you know, Gaza in four weeks.
Faisal Al Yafai
Yeah.
Dr Sanam Vakil
You know, our brains can handle multiple things, and we should be actively engaging on everything simultaneously.
Faisal Al Yafai
I think we will come to the audience in one moment, so prepare your questions, but, Galip, before – what do you think, do you think Erdoğan will sit on this Board of Peace?
Galip Dalay
Well, Erdoğan has very good relation with Trump, and definitely, probably, you know, he will be part of it, whatever this Board of Peace means. The Israel has been adamant.
Faisal Al Yafai
Yeah.
Galip Dalay
But I think therefore this is in a sense a win for Erdoğan, the fact that Israel could not dissuade or prevent him being there. Because I think the Israel was – particularly for Turkey and Qatar, was quite lobbying, and the language that came from there was also quite critical. So, therefore, Turkey and Erdoğan, and – but also Hakan Fidan is also there, so I think they will remain in very close collaboration with Trump administration on this one.
Faisal Al Yafai
Okay, let’s come to the audience. We’re going to come to you, and then we’ll come back to the panel. So, if you don’t mind, can you raise your hand to ask questions, and can you remain seated? The microphone will come to you, and if you don’t mind, can you also identify yourself before you start? The gentleman there with the glasses, here. We’ll take a couple, and then we’ll come back to the panel.
Houman
Hello, thank you very much for the amazing speech. My name is Houman, I’m a PhD Researcher on financial crime, I focus on Russia, China and Iran. Looking ahead to 2026, should financial crime and economic espionage linked to Iran be viewed as a central strategic threat in the Middle East and North Africa on par with military conflict, and how are regional and international actors adopting their security frameworks in responses? Thank you.
Faisal Al Yafai
Thank you. Someone else. The gentleman here, in the front, who’s coming, and then the gentleman over there, and do we have any…?
Ahmed Shahat
Thank you.
Faisal Al Yafai
And the lady at the back afterwards. Hello.
Ahmed Shahat
Hello. Thank you very much for this enlightening speeches. My name is Ahmed Shahat, and I am a Palestinian from Gaza, and I – you ask a very important question, would people get out of tents during the 2026? And this nice lady said she doesn’t know…
Faisal Al Yafai
Hmmm.
Ahmed Shahat
…but I can tell you, no, they will not get out of tents during 2026 because of the bureaucracy, because of the control of Israeli on all borders of Gaza. Gaza is still under severe blockade from Israel.
Faisal Al Yafai
You’re not optimistic at all?
Ahmed Shahat
I’m not. Well, on this particular issue, I’m not. I hope so. I hope to see mobile homes, which our committee has announced recently that they will – they need 200,000 mobile homes to all over Gaza…
Faisal Al Yafai
Okay.
Ahmed Shahat
…but this would be very difficult to achieve.
Faisal Al Yafai
Do you have a question or you were just expressing that…?
Ahmed Shahat
No, I just want to have a comment.
Faisal Al Yafai
Just to make the point, okay.
Ahmed Shahat
However, let me ask a simple question.
Faisal Al Yafai
Yeah.
Ahmed Shahat
I did not hear you focus on the peace process between the Palestinians and the Israelis.
Faisal Al Yafai
Hmmm.
Ahmed Shahat
I mean…
Faisal Al Yafai
That’s true.
Ahmed Shahat
…Netanyahu was invited to join the, what you call the…
Faisal Al Yafai
Yeah, the Board of Peace.
Ahmed Shahat
Board of Peace, yes.
Faisal Al Yafai
Yeah.
Ahmed Shahat
And Netanyahu is the main cause of the whole troubles in the Middle East.
Faisal Al Yafai
Okay, I want to…
Ahmed Shahat
Thank you.
Faisal Al Yafai
Yeah, thank you.
Ahmed Shahat
Thank you.
Faisal Al Yafai
And then the gentleman over there. So, we’ve got financial crimes, whether this peace process will ever reignite, and then…
Dr Adel Omar
Hi.
Faisal Al Yafai
Hi.
Dr Adel Omar
Thanks for this invitation. Dr Adel Omar, from Libya Presidential Council, Public Policy Office, and the Head of the International Department at Libya Center for Strategic and Futuristic Studies. My questions to the panel. In Libya specifically, is Turkey acting more as a stabilising stakeholder or as a conflict manager preserving largen – leverage without resolutions?
Faisal Al Yafai
Did you say Turkey?
Dr Adel Omar
Turkey.
Faisal Al Yafai
Is Turkey acting that way? Yeah, good question.
Dr Adel Omar
Every…
Faisal Al Yafai
Tim will take that one, and then the lady there, I think.
Imogen Watson
Hi, I don’t know if you can hear me. My name’s Imogen. I’m Imogen Watson. I’m a Chatham House member. My question is about the role of more moderate countries in the region. So, what, if anything, do you think Jordan, for example, could be doing, especially considering its large Palestinian population and obviously it’s got the West Bank border and the increase of settlements in the West Bank? Are there any roles in particular that Jordan could or should be playing, or what does its future look like for 2026?
Faisal Al Yafai
Do you have an opinion on that?
Imogen Watson
No, I don’t. I just don’t hear it talked about much, and it’s…
Faisal Al Yafai
Yeah.
Imogen Watson
…one of re – it’s one of the areas I have visited, so I’m curious to hear if anybody has any insight on that one.
Faisal Al Yafai
Interesting. Alright, thank you very much. Thank you, all of you. Who wants to start? Tim, do you want to start with a Turkey question since it’s, kind of, very discreet?
Tim Eaton
Hmmm.
Faisal Al Yafai
And then we’ll talk on – decide who wants to do financial crimes, which is very interesting. Thank you.
Tim Eaton
Well, thank you for the question, Dr Adel. Turkey has really had a, kind of, transformational impact in Libya over recent years. If we were to rewind to 2020, you would have seen all kinds of protests about Ottoman invasion from – coming from the east and very potent opposition, particularly from the eastern part of the country. But really, in 2026, you would say that Turkey is the best-placed international player to talk and do business with everyone.
I think in your question, I think you asked whether Turkey was a “stabiliser or a conflict manager.” They might be synonymous in that sense. Turkey clearly has prevented flashpoints of conflict, as we saw in May 2025, following the killing of a local armed group leader, which could have spilled over into wider violence had Turkey not prevented that from taking place. But it struggled to be proactive in getting actual agreements between those players that can last, and I think the fragmentation on the Libyan scene makes that pretty difficult. So, from what I’m watching, it seems that Turkey is more open to working through the system and these faultlines to achieve its objectives, rather than trying to transform the landscape in any way. It’s trying to maintain positive relations, whilst pushing through some key objectives. For example, its memorandum of understanding on the East Med, which is very important to Turkey, or agreements over arms and bases with both East and West.
So, it’s managed that pretty well to date, and it seems that it’s at least a little bit ambivalent about efforts to sol – resolve the crisis with the UN. It tends to sit back, largely, from what I can tell, but I’d also be interested in what Galip thinks on this. It seems to me that pragmatism has really prevailed and they’re just trying to manage things rather than get embroiled in any, kind of, major resolution efforts in Libya.
Faisal Al Yafai
Galip, what do you think about that?
Galip Dalay
Well, I think…
Faisal Al Yafai
And, also, actually, ‘cause there was a question I wanted to ask you, which I think is related to this, and it was to do with regional power blocs. When Bronwen Maddox, the Director of Chatham House, gave her speech last week, she talked about how – most of you were here, I’m sure, but those who weren’t, she talked about how the – as the global order unravels, you have these new regional blocs…
Galip Dalay
Hmmm hmm.
Faisal Al Yafai
…and one of those, of course, is likely to be led by Turkey. So, in a way, its actions in Libya are instructive for what it might seek to do elsewhere.
Galip Dalay
I think the Libya is, in a sense, clearly illustrative of Turkey’s preferences of not being bogged down in any camp, very clearly. I mean, for quite some times, Turkey was clearly on the side of the Western Libya. It was the one, basically, with the military force on the ground that probably prevented the fall of the Western Libyan – the UN-recognised government in the Western Libya. But now the Turkey enjoys as much good relation with Eastern Libya as it does with the Western Libya. I mean…
Faisal Al Yafai
Hmmm.
Galip Dalay
…Saddam Haftar and others are in Ankara quite frequently, and likewise, the Turkish Official gave picture with them quite of – quite clearly.
Similarly, I mean, the Libya was the file turned into the major geopolitical faultline between Turkey, UAE and Egypt, but now it turn into a major point of conversation, co-operation, in a sense, you know, understanding. It’s quite illustrative that Turkey and Egypt right now are more and more engaging in dialogue and co-operation in Eastern Mediterranean. I mean, they engage in the – in, you know, even defence industry conversations, and bear in mind – bearing in mind that Turkey was probably one of the strongest critic of the Sisi when he came to power through a coup, this is quite, I would say, transformative.
And to your questions…
Faisal Al Yafai
Yeah, about the regional…
Galip Dalay
Exactly, the re…
Faisal Al Yafai
Yeah.
Galip Dalay
I think – because I think the question that also under – like, the assumption that underpins is the changing nature of the US role in many regional settings. So, the regional blocs, like, one of the fundamental question will be how any regional blocs will position themselves vis-à-vis the US and other international powers. We have this paradox of the US where we – when you look at them, particularly in the Middle East. The US is both indispensable and unreliable at the same time, and that is the broader picture within which you have to operate. It is indispensable because no actor can even come close to fill the void that the US is, you know, filling.
It is the only one that can, you know, force Netanyahu to do the things that he doesn’t want to. It is the –probably the only one right now that can cut a deal between the Syrian Kurds and the central government in Damascus. It is the only one that basically, you know, changed the dynamics at the regional as massively as it does. So, from this point of view, everyone in the region, even if they don’t rely on US, they double down on their relation with the US, to make sure that they – you are not on the bad side of the US.
Faisal Al Yafai
But at the same time…
Galip Dalay
But at the same time, and that’s where the regional blocs comes.
Faisal Al Yafai
Hmmm hmm.
Galip Dalay
It is unreliable, you cannot rely on US, and I think that’s clearly – look at the Saudi-Pakistani Defence Pact and possibly that will bring Turkey on board. As well, I mean, the Foreign Minister Fidan already said that, you know, the negotiation and the conversation, Iran is taking place with the anticipation that it might include also, Egypt, as well. But we have to bear in mind, like, what is the nature of these regional blocs? Will they be able to provide the regional security? I think partly, yes, like to fill…
Faisal Al Yafai
Yeah.
Galip Dalay
…but will they be able to fill the gap that previous regional hegemon was playing…
Faisal Al Yafai
Yeah.
Galip Dalay
…such as the US? I think still not there yet, but definitely the size – the power of the regional powers in the regional politics is increasing, and it will continue to do so. But I think one thing that Turkey will avoid that not to give the image that there is regional blocs.
Faisal Al Yafai
Renad, I’ll come back to the financial crimes thing, we’ll do the questions – we’ll do another round of questions in a moment, but we’ll come back to the financial crimes. But I want to ask you about this, because this idea of the emerging multi-alignment, it’s something that, obviously, you and I have talked about before, but it’s something where you can imagine a jockeying for position among Iraq, Turkey, the Gulf states, to try to figure out who is going to lead regional blocs, or at least they’re going to try to work out ways for them to get what they can out of this fragmenting regional order.
Dr Renad Mansour
I actually think, in a way, your question on multi-alignment and the question on financial crimes is related. I think if you look at the financial system that has developed, you know, Iran’s ability to operate, to some extent, in a sanctioned economy, it’s not only – its economic interests are not only with the axis of resistance or China or Russia.
Faisal Al Yafai
Right.
Dr Renad Mansour
In fact, you have many other countries, states, business people aligned with the US and Europe, who are also operating in supply chains across the chain that benefit Iran or that are part of Iran’s economic interests, as well. So, in fact, if you want to truly understand what this multi-alignment looks like, follow these supply chains and see how actors are hedging, how people are pursuing – you know, states and businesses are pursuing profit without interest. Oh, this is an Iranian. Oh, this is a Saudi. Oh, this is licit. Oh, this is illicit. It’s blurred.
Faisal Al Yafai
It’s blurred.
Dr Renad Mansour
It’s blurred, and you see that. There’s been a lot done on, for example, the shadow fleets, the ships that go, you know, from Iran and somehow make it all the way to China. It’s a long way, and it’s not only the axis of resistance right now that’s – that is part of that system. So, I guess…
Faisal Al Yafai
What do you think that means for even the idea of nation states? ‘Cause this is something you were saying, Tim, right, about Libya, that so much of the spending is off the books, if that is the case elsewhere, Renad, then what…?
Dr Renad Mansour
So, what we’re saying is that the sanctioned global economy has ballooned in the last few years. It’s no longer a tiny bit of the economy, and why that is is because the political environment is much more fragmented than it was during this Cold War, when if you were an actor, you had to, to some extent, I mean, obviously there are exceptions – you were either West or East, Communist or Democrat. You know, and so there’s often these binaries that are applied, and I think now in this, kind of, global fragmentation that’s happening, those in the region are making decisions based on issues. On this issue, on this supply chain, I will make a, you know, an agreement with this side or the other side. There aren’t poles. So, even multipolar becomes a problematic word because what are the poles?
Faisal Al Yafai
Right.
Dr Renad Mansour
Which is why we’ve, sort of, focused in on this idea of multi-alignment…
Faisal Al Yafai
You have led…
Dr Renad Mansour
…which we have come up with.
Faisal Al Yafai
…me very nicely to our next question about regional competition, for Sanam. But just for the sake of the lady who asked about Jordan, Renad, do you want to briefly answer the question about Jordan? What do you think that Jordan could do? ‘Cause Jordan is – any Jordanians, I’m about to call Jordan not a middle power, it’s going to be very upsetting, but these, sort of, smaller states, what can they do in this fragmented ecosystem?
Dr Renad Mansour
I mean, if Galip is saying that the US is indispensable to all states in the region, I think the agency of these smaller states like Jordan is quite limited. Jordan, of course, is intimately connected to the Palestine – Palestinian question and need to be leading it. But at the end of the day, I think Jordan is also seeing itself as an iso – sort of, an island amidst so many different conflicts and trying to survive pragmatically, as well as having internal domestic issues connected to the – you know, these wider questions. So, I don’t work on Jordan, so I can’t answer Jordan, but that’s the, sort of – I think, in a nutshell, I would not expect Jordan really to be taking much initiative.
Faisal Al Yafai
Even on something that matters to them so much, like Palestine and – alright, let’s keep going, because we have to talk about Yemen. And there have been so many shocking things, Sanam, that happened the last year, and then we just forgot about them, and one of the most shocking events came at the very end of the year, when Saudi Arabia bombed the Yemeni Port of Mukalla, bombing the UAE shipment. And I wonder what you think about what we’re seeing now in terms of the regional competition between these Gulf states and elsewhere, as well, that played out across Yemen?
Dr Sanam Vakil
Sure. Can I just say something quickly, also on Israel-Palestine, as well? I mean, obviously we talked about the ‘Board of Peace’. We – you know, the structures beneath it also include a technocratic committee that has an acronym that I haven’t memorised yet, but it also has, of course, a head, Ali Shaath, whose responsibility is governance and restoring sort of…
Member
My cousin, by the way.
Dr Sanam Vakil
Pardon?
Member
He is my cousin.
Dr Sanam Vakil
Fantastic.
Faisal Al Yafai
Will you – can you invite him?
Dr Sanam Vakil
Wish him well. Wish him well and we…
Faisal Al Yafai
At least somebody gets a job on the Board of Peace.
Dr Sanam Vakil
We’re looking forward to hosting him at some point. Good luck. He has a monumental task ahead of him, and so, I think it is the delivery of basic services that are most important, but that delivery, of course, hits a roadblock when you think about a peace process, because obviously, there is no peace process. We’ve tossed around the word ‘management’ and that’s where we are right now. We are just managing things across the Middle East, preventing things from getting worse, hoping ceasefires are held together. There are no real substantial peace processes underway. There are a lot of backdoor discussions, but what is urgently needed, certainly in this context, is a peace process, but in the context of multi-alignment, getting back to that word that we…
Faisal Al Yafai
Yeah, regional competition.
Dr Sanam Vakil
And regional competition, developing a peace process is very hard to imagine, because you have to bring together not just the states, maybe some non-states, maybe some of the economic players in the scene, as well, and creating a process requires hard, disciplined work. The last time we saw a multilateral deal was the JCPOA, the Iran Nuclear Agreement, that took ten years to negotiate and three years to fall apart, and here we are in 2026, uncertain about the trajectory. So, thinking about that in the context of regional competition, by the end of last year, I was mulling over yet another negative piece that I wanted to write about how, yes, the region has done its best to stabilise things, but the endemic feature of regional competition hadn’t really gone away.
Faisal Al Yafai
Yes.
Dr Sanam Vakil
And I decided, let’s not be negative, just wrap it up for the year and hope things are okay. But yeah, obviously, competitive dynamics, particularly with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, exploded in Yemen for a whole slew of reasons, and my colleague, Farea Al-Muslimi, is here, he is the real expert on this topic. But, you know, these tensions are coming to a head over no real vision for what comes next in Yemen. There is sort of, again, management, management of the Houthis, and then that management is somehow contained for a period of time. Donald Trump bombed them, the Israelis bombed them, we came to a deal. Okay, job done for now, and then nobody was paying attention to the dynamics in southern Yemen.
Faisal Al Yafai
Right.
Dr Sanam Vakil
Which we have been watching for quite some time. We were trying to raise flags in capitals and Whitehall, “Don’t forget Yemen, you know, this is bubbling underneath the surface,” and, ultimately speaking, these are two states ambitious, competitive, and have been for quite some time. Haven’t just been competing with different visions in Yemen. It’s been broader across the region. It’s been Sudan, it’s been on OPEC+, it’s been on COP, it’s been on the economy.
Faisal Al Yafai
Yeah, right.
Dr Sanam Vakil
And it’s not probably gonna become like a Qatar blockade, but these two countries…
Faisal Al Yafai
Yeah.
Dr Sanam Vakil
…do need a conflict management mechanism. It does exist in the GCC. They’re currently, sort of, hashing it out on social media, like, you know, some popular British families.
Faisal Al Yafai
The Beckhams, we’re talking about the Beckhams. About the vision, the question of the vision. Do you think – there was a tweet by H. A. Hellyer, the – this Analyst that some of you know, about that the Saudi-UAE conflict over Yemen is about a “difference of vision in how they see the Middle East.” The idea being that the UAE is, kind of, more interested in being involved in Libya and involved in Sudan and involved everywhere, whereas maybe Saudi Arabia at this point is looking for more state-to-state relationships. Do you put any stock in that idea?
Dr Sanam Vakil
I mean, I think we as Analysts always try to intellectualise what we see happening on the ground, and certainly, Saudi Arabia believes in the state-based approach. Whereas the UAE, for quite some time and across all of the geographies that we work on and cover, have been supporting proxy groups around the region, and this has come to a head. It’s also very much tied to the Abraham Accords, the strengthening and doubling down of the UAE in that relationship at a time where Saudi Arabia has moved away from normalisation. So, there are a lot of conflict points.
Faisal Al Yafai
Hmmm.
Dr Sanam Vakil
I think the key is to be able to compartmentalise the conflicts and be able to work productively.
Faisal Al Yafai
Hmmm, it’s a different track.
Dr Sanam Vakil
Yes.
Faisal Al Yafai
We have to get through a few more before – ‘cause then the audience wants to come in. Just briefly about Iraq, Renad. Because I feel like the parliamentary election in November was – it was a bit of a damp squib news wise. And I wonder if the reason for that – obviously there was other things going on in the world, but I wonder if the reason for that was also that maybe Iraqis and the outside world didn’t quite know what to make of this election. They didn’t quite know where it fitted into the different visions we just talked about.
Dr Renad Mansour
Yeah, as I said, I think Iraq and the Iraqi Government has said, “We want to stay out of all of this for once,” and the policy has been, we’re out, we’re – you know, we’re friends with everyone. In fact, last September, the US Operation Inherent Resolve, which was the US troop presence in Baghdad, moved out. Did any – how many people even knew that?
Faisal Al Yafai
Yeah.
Dr Renad Mansour
Right? This was – this is a big deal.
Faisal Al Yafai
Mission accomplished, finally.
Dr Renad Mansour
That was announced five weeks after 2000 – in March 2003, so it’s been many missions and many accomplishments.
Dr Sanam Vakil
[Inaudible – 56:54].
Dr Renad Mansour
But so, I think where Iraq is now is, yes, on the surface, stable, spec – especially vis-à-vis what’s happening elsewhere in the region, but, you know, if I speak of the elections, the current candidates, the front-runner right now to become Prime Minister is Nouri al-Maliki.
Faisal Al Yafai
Right, right, this is the suggestion…
Dr Renad Mansour
So, we’re…
Faisal Al Yafai
…and I saw the report.
Dr Renad Mansour
This is – I mean, I think many Analysts don’t think this will happen, but we have Maliki coming, we have IS – I mean, the Iraqi Government is very worried about this – what will happen in Syria, because last time there was this conflict in Syria, ISIS showed up again in Iraq.
Faisal Al Yafai
Right, and we were talking about what might happen on its eastern flank.
Dr Renad Mansour
Yes.
Faisal Al Yafai
Now what might happen on the western…
Dr Renad Mansour
On that, it’s a very serious threat to the Iraqi leadership right now. So, they’ve tried to stay out of it, but I think in the next few years, they’ll be really, really tested on this.
Faisal Al Yafai
Galip, let’s bring you in on Syria and the Kurds, and then we’ll come to the audience. I think I was surprised, as most of us were, by how quickly the new Syrian Government took control of these regions that were formerly autonomous. First of all, I should ask you if you think that that will hold, do you think that they will be able to keep them away from the border? And then, secondly, I guess, what does it mean for Turkey? We were alluding to it earlier, that one of the primary roles – the primary concerns that Turkey had was to push the Kurds, the Syrian Kurds, away from the border. Now they’ve achieved that.
Galip Dalay
Well, I think we just had Tom Barrack on his social media accounts, and nowadays, like, you know, you have to read the social media accounts to make sense of the international affairs. He very much like, you know, posted a lengthy tweet in which he clearly stated that, you know, the US priority right now has shifted to Damascus. The partnership with SDF was as a result of the anti-ISIS.
Dr Renad Mansour
Mission accomplished.
Galip Dalay
Mission accomplished. So, therefore, right now, this partnership has already expired, and now they want the SDF to be integrated into central state, as this will be the focus of the US partnership in the region.
Faisal Al Yafai
Hmmm.
Galip Dalay
And I think this and demography, because the most of the area that the Kurds has withdrawn from, particularly in the, you know, eastern and – the eastern part of the Euphrates, was the Arab majority area. And then the partnership, the partnership – because the state – the Syrian state has not entered the Qamishli or the Kobani or the part of the Kurdish majority Hasakah. So, it’s the Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, the part of the Hasakah. So, I think that’s the – clearly the structure that was born out of a very special time period…
Faisal Al Yafai
Okay.
Galip Dalay
…cannot be sustained when this time period goes and when the patron that gave birth to this structure is no longer there. Because this was born with the US clear support, and with Assad in Damascus, and with ISIS being the main result. The central question right now that I see for Syria is the legitimacy of the central authority is very important for any system to be sustainable, and in this regard, the civil wars politicises all the identity groups. So, therefore, the demands and aspiration of the identity groups to be met and to be recognised and to be addressed in the political and constitutional process is very important. This is not only for the Kurds, it’s also for Alawite, for Druze, for all of them.
But at the same time, I think it’s – right now has become very clear that it will not be a military – a security in – autonomy in security. It will not be any form of administrative autonomy. It will be a limited, like, a limited administrative authority plus the language, cultural and recognition rights through the constitution. That is more or less the deal. The question, will it be sustainable? I think probably, yes. I mean, it might not be an easy one to – for the SDF to right now, you know, maybe to swallow, but I think, like, with the – without the – devoid of the US support, probably – and also, if the peace process in Turkey succeeds, I think that will also – will be sustainable. Because the SDF, the Syrian Kurdish file, is very much also intertwined with Turkish Kurdish file.
Faisal Al Yafai
Okay. Tim, I want to end on this, because I know we’ve talked about Libya, and we’ve also talked about some very big ideas, but I wonder if, just as an ending point, we can think about what the role of these outside powers have been on a country like Libya, and whether so many years now, six – 15 years after the intervention, Libya is in a better place because of these outside interventions, or on a path, I don’t want to be negative about it, or on a path, or whether the – all of the conversations we’ve had about these outside powers riding roughshod over people’s territory, whether that is exacerbated and demonstrated in Libya.
Tim Eaton
Well, I think it’s a combination, in a sense. Sometimes I think that thinking about this can be really, you know, reductionist in thinking about proxies as if, you know, those in Libya don’t have any say over…
Faisal Al Yafai
Right.
Tim Eaton
…what they’re doing or their own agency. That’s clearly not true. What has been a clear systemic impact is that the fragmentation of the international order has made it easier for the array of Libyan actors to obtain international patronage, to form alliances with different groups. So, what became a discussion about resolving conflict between local actors then becomes connected to a second level of international struggles for influence and – over the future of the country.
So, it’s quite interesting, actually, looking back at the former Special Representative Ghassan Salamé’s attempts to bring a political process to fruition in Libya, he starts off and realises that his attempt with the Libyans has no success because the internationals are causing all of this friction behind the scenes, or they’re pushing their person over someone else, or it just becomes so easy for any actor to spoil, because you just have so many levers to pull. So, he starts then by trying to actually agree among the international actors first and then bring it down to the Libyan level.
So, really where we are now, though, is a very confusing situation, where a lot of the alliances are quite contradictory. So, you’ve got Haftar building quite positive relations with the US, at the same time he’s still visiting Moscow with Putin.
Faisal Al Yafai
Yeah.
Tim Eaton
You’ve got Turkey having very cordial relations in eastern Libya, as well as cordial relations in parts of western Libya, but these contradictions don’t have a mechanism of being resolved. So, I think that’s the trick, right? And then, that’s – when Sanam says it would take a really sustained effort for people to take back – to take a step back and look how to resolve these issues, and then also agree to enforce it over time…
Faisal Al Yafai
Yeah.
Tim Eaton
…that’s a level of complexity that very few, if anyone, is interested in these days.
Faisal Al Yafai
Yeah. So, this was the point, Sanam, that you were making before, I think you almost partly made it, that the difficulties when you have all these different actors, none of them really want these conflicts to be resolved. There’s no benefit to them. They prefer to have them managed for an extended period.
Dr Sanam Vakil
Well, I do think that, you know, somewhere along the course of these two terribly turbulent years in the region, there is an awareness that conflict management is unsustainable, it’s not good for business, it’s not good for the delivery of visions in the Gulf, and that these conflicts became very interconnected. So, there is this transnational nature of conflict that is really destabilising.
What we haven’t seen is enough agency or enough co-ordination, I think, in my view, from Middle Eastern states, middle, small, and maybe those hegemonic, to move to the next level. And I think here we haven’t mentioned Israel at all, this is a pivotal year for Israel. It will go to the ballot box and, you know, the outcome, I think, will be really important. Whether it’s Netanyahu that will try to cobble together a new government, he currently doesn’t have the numbers, you know, it’s not looking good, or the so-called opposition that are equally weak. This will certainly be a referendum on the past two years and what Israelis are looking for, and there are serious domestic issues pertaining to the budget, that if it is not passed by the end of March, the government will collapse. There is still the unending question of the draft law and the Haredim coming into the IDF that hasn’t been resolved. So, there is a lot of stalling and kicking the can down the road across the region, and I think that that, of course, presents a lot of dangerous flashpoints for the year ahead.
Faisal Al Yafai
Okay, let’s come to the audience. As before, if you don’t mind, raise your hand, the microphone will come to you, and if you can identify yourself. I’m trying to see who’s there. Who’s that gentleman at the back with their hand up? Yeah, should we go to that person? We’ll take a few and then we’ll come to the panel.
Dr Sanam Vakil
Oops, sorry.
Member
Gentleman at the back.
Paul Raymond
Thank you. I’m Paul Raymond. I’m an Arabic Translator working on a lot of the issues you’ve been talking about. I just wanted to ask Galip, what bearing, if any, does the collapse of the SDF have on the competition between Turkey and Israel in Syria?
Faisal Al Yafai
Okay, good. Someone else. Do we have any women asking questions? Can we get some – the woman over there, if you don’t mind.
Member
This idea of binaries came up, I think, with your talk, and I was just wondering whether you don’t think it’s going to – it actually will be coming back, instead of, you know, these countries having these nuanced positions. Because, you know, with such an erratic leadership from the US, so one example is obviously the tariff policy and how – so some of the biggest partners of Iran are UAE and Turkey but now being threatened with an extra tariff if they do continue trading with Iran. I was just wondering whether you would maybe think that it’s actually – this idea of binaries are coming back, you know, we’re almost going back to that Cold War type of division, yeah.
Faisal Al Yafai
Okay, why don’t you take those two? I – we’ve overshot the time slightly, so I think we’ll just have those two. And then, actually, let’s have one more, which is this question from Andrew Weatherall, who says – he says, “Does the region edge towards stabilisation or becoming more unstable this year?” which was the point of the whole panel. So, those three questions, if you guys on the panel would like to answer it. Who wants to start? Galip, well, that was directed directly at you, so perhaps you could take it.
Galip Dalay
Well, I mean, the Turkey-Israeli competition in – Israel competition in Syria is effectively about the two different vision of Syria. One of them is a centralised Syria with, you know, a strong central state, which is the Turkey’s vision of Syria, where the Syria is very much situated within the Arab [Falls – 68:32]. And obviously, you know, with whom Turkey has, like, very deep relations. The other one is the Israel’s vision, which is the Syria that is fragmented, where the identity groups has, you know, more, like, heightened status in Syria. So, in this regard, the SDF’s integration order more attempt of centralisation, works more in – you know, towards the direction of the Turkey’s idea of the Syria than the Israel’s idea of Syria.
The interesting part is not only the Turkey and Israel’s idea of the Syria is diverging, but the US and Israel’s idea of Syria is diverging, as well. I mean, at least the way that it has been articulated by Trump, by Special Envoy Tom Barrack, is clearly – even in today’s tweet, he clearly made – he made it very sure that this US idea of Syria is understood, which is a centralised Syria, which recognises the identity, cultural, linguistic, rights of the different components, most important components, but the state as a centralised phenomena. So, in this regard, I would say that would be a setback for the Israel, as well.
But very final word.
Faisal Al Yafai
Please, yeah.
Galip Dalay
In the region, the disorder right now is – should not be treated as a transitional phase. This is the new order for long time. The es – dynamics of escalation in the region is quite there. One concern that I would have is Ira – sorry, Isra – Syria and Iraq, as well, this space needs to be watched much more carefully.
Faisal Al Yafai
Very good. Renad, do you want to come in on the lady’s question? And then Sanam, you can…
Dr Renad Mansour
So, I guess what’s – your question, sort of, one – I’m assuming, underlying that – underlining that is this spectacular US Trump administration, which is committing these spectacular events and showing that America is actually still somehow a unipolar power or a hegemonic power that, you know, will pull everyone in, and no other country is anywhere near the US. And that being coupled with a few Trump people have made it clear to us in conversations that, “The Biden administration was about conflict management, we’re about conflict resolution. We’re just going to solve things.” The problem with this is their solutions aren’t necessarily thought out. I think it’s quite erratic, and so rationally, those who study, sort of, the history of foreign policy would say that you might, I mean, it’s a gamble, but most likely that these spectacular decisions and events might rep – have repercussions and backlash, and so not to see everything from right now.
And to answer the binary question very quickly, we used to write, you know, when we do these Chatham House policy papers, the Western position, you know, “The West does this, the West” – what does ‘the West’ even mean anymore? And so, I don’t think that the US administration is bringing back binaries or poles. I think it’s actually in some ways attacking one of the poles that we often assumed would be almost unattackable or unpenetrable.
Faisal Al Yafai
Yeah. Do you want to end by telling us whether you think that we are stabilising or spiralling?
Dr Sanam Vakil
I think it will be stabilisation in name only. This is a world that would like everything to still be positive, and so we will, you know, keep the edifice of stabilisation. But obviously, what we’re saying here in many different ways is under the surface, there are a lot of very important and challenging dynamics that are not being addressed, whether it’s corruption, accountability, protests, management of conflicts, it’s all still there. And without the region being more engaged and managing – the management – and, you know, I’m a big believer that waiting for President Trump or Washington is dangerous for the Middle East. So, it’s, sort of, a now or never moment.
Faisal Al Yafai
Great. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you. We will be having a drinks reception upstairs if you want to join us. I also want to say that we have quite a few of the Chatham House team from the MENA Programme with us, so if that – if they are in your area of expertise and you want to seek them out upstairs, that would be great. We will have the Researchers, Hayder Al-Shakeri and Farea Al-Muslimi with us, Associate Fellows Lina Khatib, Zizette Darkazally, Julie Norman, Yossi Mekelberg and David Butter.
Dr Sanam Vakil
And Neil Quilliam.
Faisal Al Yafai
And Neil Quilliam. But for now, thank you all for a fascinating discussion. Thank you for joining us.
Dr Sanam Vakil
Ahmed Aboudouh [applause].
